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HUNTING STAG WITH FLY PAPER:  
A HYBRID FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT  
FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
Dana Brakman Reiser* 
Steven A. Dean** 
Abstract: Social entrepreneurs and socially motivated investors share a 
belief in the power of social enterprise: ventures that pursue a “double 
bottom line” of profit and social good. Unfortunately, they also share a 
deep mutual suspicion. Recognizing that social ventures—just like tradi-
tional for-profit and nonprofit enterprises—need capital to flourish, this 
Article offers a financing tool to transform that skepticism into commit-
ment. Unlike the array of new entities that have emerged in recent 
years—including L3Cs, benefit corporations, and flexible purpose corpo-
rations—the hybrid financial instrument this Article describes provides a 
robust and transparent solution to the puzzle that lies at the heart of 
every social enterprise: how to blend a profit motive with a social mission. 
Recognizing their shared dilemma as an example of what economists call 
a stag hunt, FLY Paper strikes that elusive balance by allowing investors 
and entrepreneurs to signal credibly a reciprocal commitment to the pur-
suit of a double bottom line. 
Introduction 
 When Google issued shares to the public for the first time, the en-
trepreneurs at its helm had more than immediate self-gratification in 
mind.1 They recognized that the transaction others disdained as a nec-
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1 Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 
Mich. L. Rev. 1581, 1584 (2006) (“When Google structured its IPO as an auction, it rein-
forced Google’s identity as an innovative, egalitarian, playful, trustworthy company. Talk-
ing about Google’s IPO makes you want to use Google’s products.”). 
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essary evil—a dark brew of lawyers and bankers stirred by greed—could 
be far more.2 The unconventional auction structure they employed left 
no room for doubt that Google’s “don’t be evil” mantra guided its 
leaders’ actions even when billions of dollars hung in the balance.3 
Flexible Low-Yield (“FLY”) Paper, the hybrid financial instrument this 
Article describes, offers social entrepreneurs the same opportunity to 
remake a symbol of greed into proof of their commitment to leaven 
capitalism with idealism. 
 It is conventional wisdom that when social entrepreneurs4 accept 
capital from investors they take the first step down a slippery slope to-
ward wholeheartedly embracing a profit motive.5 By contrast, when a 
charity raises capital from donors, its commitment to exclusively pursue 
social good is permanent.6 A charity’s assets possess complete legacy 
protection, guaranteeing their perpetual dedication to charitable pur-
poses. Until now, outside that charitable context, investments seem in-
variably to undermine an enterprise’s commitment to the pursuit of its 
social objectives.7 
 FLY Paper succeeds where prior efforts have failed primarily be-
cause it reflects the insight—new to the literature—that the problem 
social entrepreneurs and investors face can be described as a stag hunt 
                                                                                                                      
2 See id. at 1594 (“The challenge for Google was to turn a process associated with greed 
into something positive. Structuring its IPO as an auction did the trick.”). 
3 See id. at 1604 (“Rather than having underwriters set the price using the traditional 
book-building method, investors set the price for shares over the Internet. The voice of the 
people, not Wall Street insiders, set the price.”). 
4 The definition of the term “social entrepreneur” has been the subject of lingering 
scholarly debate in the legal and business literature. See Samer Abu-Saifan, Social Entrepre-
neurship: Definition and Boundaries, Tech. Innovation Mgmt. Rev., Feb. 2012, at 22, 22–23 
(indicating that “social entrepreneur” has no uniform definition and that there is a need 
for a better definition of the term). This article embraces a general definition that has 
gained traction in the legal literature: “the social enterprise, can be defined as ‘an organi-
zation or venture that achieves its primary social or environmental mission using business 
methods.’” Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 59, 59 
(2010) (quoting About Social Enterprise Alliance, Social Enterprise Alliance, http://www. 
se-alliance.org/about (last visited July 20, 2013)). 
5 This same fear rears its head whenever profit and philanthropy are blended. See, e.g., 
Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2437, 2466 (2009) [here-
inafter Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy] (“The ultimate mission-based fear raised by 
the for-profit philanthropy model is that resources contributed with much fanfare to 
achievement of philanthropic aims could, one day, be recaptured by the for-profit and 
used instead for profit-making purposes.”). 
6 See infra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing how the nondistribution con-
straint imposed on charities ensures that all the assets contributed to the charity remain 
part of its operations permanently). 
7 See infra notes 47–61 and accompanying text. 
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or assurance game.8 Just as the figurative hunters long to return home 
with a shared stag, investors and entrepreneurs prefer cooperation and 
a double bottom line.9 Although they would both benefit by balancing 
an enterprise’s social mission alongside their own financial interests, 
doing so asks each to take a leap of faith.10 Low-profit Limited Liability 
Companies (“L3Cs”), benefit corporations, and flexible purpose corpo-
rations (“FPC”)—although specifically designed for social enterprise— 
fail to give investors and entrepreneurs the confidence needed to make 
that leap.11 They may provide one or the other with a means of making 
a credible commitment to the enterprise’s social mission, but never 
both. 
 FLY Paper fills that gap by providing both entrepreneurs and in-
vestors with confidence that their commitment to the enterprise’s mis-
                                                                                                                      
8 See Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law 35–36 (1998) (describing 
a stag hunt). The stag hunt involves two hunters who would each prefer to hunt a stag 
(here, pursue a double bottom line) rather than a hare (maximize financial returns). To 
be successful in the stag hunt, the hunters must coordinate. To catch hares, they do not—
but catching a hare yields a more minimal return. Each worries that the other hunter will 
abandon the joint stag hunt to catch a hare on his own (abandon the double bottom line 
to pursue his financial self-interest) and so neither is willing to commit to the stag hunt. 
Notwithstanding that concern, both hunters prefer the prospect of a shared stag to a hare 
( just as both the entrepreneur and investor prefer a blended return). 
9 Social entrepreneurs and their investor counterparts operate under two conditions 
of uncertainty that prevent them from balancing profit-making and social good. First, and 
most importantly, at the outset each is unsure of the other’s sincerity and commitment to 
the dual mission. Second, although each has a prospective sense of the range of potential 
profit and social gains to be generated by the venture, these estimates could turn out to be 
wildly off the mark. For example, the payoff for defection may turn out to be greater than 
what an investor had envisioned giving up for a social return (the equivalent of a hunter 
stumbling on an enormous hare). Even in this case, though, the social entrepreneur would 
want the investor to remain committed. FLY Paper provides both a clear signal of ex ante 
expectations and a commitment device to protect against future lapses. As such, FLY Paper 
operates as a valuable sorting mechanism; its terms will simply not attract investors or en-
trepreneurs looking to bilk each other with social-enterprise snake oil. 
10 Investors and social entrepreneurs face a coordination problem (i.e., an assurance 
game or stag hunt) rather than a cooperation problem (i.e., a prisoners’ dilemma). See 
Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 209, 218–19 (2009) (noting that the distinction between coordination and 
cooperation is often overlooked). The would-be coventurers need only assure one another 
that they will look beyond their own self-interest to remain committed to the enterprise’s 
social mission. Were it a prisoners’ dilemma, each would prefer to defect—abandoning the 
double bottom line—even if the other remains committed. See id. at 215 (describing the 
prisoners’ dilemma). The prisoners’ dilemma label is often misapplied to the (perhaps 
more intuitive) situation in which both prisoners can go free if both refuse to confess. Id. 
at 217–18. 
11 See infra notes 62–92 and accompanying text (discussing new organizational forms). 
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sion will be reciprocated.12 FLY Paper is a hybrid debt instrument that 
entitles investors to a modest, below-market return payable on a flexible 
schedule. This investment will provide entrepreneurs with capital, but 
will also test their resolve. If an entrepreneur agrees to sell her own 
shares, FLY Paper holders will have the option to convert their debt to 
equity on favorable terms, thereby capturing much of the gains that the 
entrepreneur would otherwise earn from “selling out.” Accordingly, 
FLY Paper creates a window of time during which social entrepreneurs 
can pursue their social missions without turning to the permanent leg-
acy protection of a charitable organization. Rather than representing a 
threat to its social mission, the investment makes the mission “sticky” 
during the FLY Paper’s term.13 When social enterprises issue FLY Paper 
to investors, neither entrepreneurs nor investors need to worry that the 
other will “defect” by unilaterally pursuing their own self-interest. 
 In one sense, FLY Paper falls well short of the solution offered by 
entities such as the L3C, the benefit corporation, and the FPC. Those 
entities promise to strike a permanent, comprehensive balance be-
tween profit and mission. Although such a broad resolution would be 
ideal, none of those hybrid entities has achieved it.14 FLY Paper makes 
a more modest pledge: to give both investors and entrepreneurs a 
means of making credible commitments to the enterprise’s mission 
over a specified term. 
 This Article argues that FLY Paper, an incremental departure from 
existing legal technologies, will go further than hybrid organizations to 
secure an enterprise’s social mission. Part I describes three types of hy-
brid organizations—L3Cs, benefit corporations, and the FPCs—that oc-
cupy the same no man’s land between nonprofit and for-profit spaces as 
FLY Paper.15 Then, Part II examines how FLY Paper facilitates coordina-
tion between entrepreneurs and investors.16 Part III describes FLY Pa-
per’s tax treatment, detailing how it allows investors to shoulder a por-
                                                                                                                      
12 FLY Paper serves simultaneously as a signal and a commitment device. See infra notes 
116–130 and accompanying text. 
13 That term could last fifteen years or more. 
14 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L. J. 681, 
705–06 (2013) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise] (arguing 
that the current specialized forms available for social enterprise do not sufficiently address 
enforcement issues). 
15 See infra notes 19–109 and accompanying text. Both FLY Paper and hybrid organiza-
tions seek investment rather than tax deductible contributions. That concession allows them 
to avoid both the operational constraints imposed on traditional tax-exempt charities and 
permanent legacy protection. 
16 See infra notes 110–178 and accompanying text. 
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tion of a social enterprise’s tax burden.17 Finally, Part IV considers what 
FLY Paper does—and no less important, what it does not—accomplish, 
identifying critical questions that remain for social entrepreneurs, inves-
tors, and the public.18 
I. Building a Vehicle for Social Enterprise 
 The founders of social enterprises want to “do well by doing 
good,” running entities that pursue both social good and profit for 
owners. These enterprises manufacture products using more expensive 
inputs to reduce their environmental impact, or give away some of their 
products to those in need.19 They employ workers who traditionally 
face obstacles to finding employment, despite these workers making 
their labor costs higher than their competitors’ costs.20 Social enter-
prises create technologies to improve the lives of those in the develop-
ing world, even though they could turn their research and develop-
ment to pursuing first world inventions at greater profit. 21  Yet the 
                                                                                                                      
 
17 See infra notes 179–240 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 241–245 and accompanying text. 
19 See, e.g., Our Promise, Happy Baby, http://www.happybabyfood.com/about-us/our-
promise (last visited July 5, 2013) (describing the company’s commitment to environmen-
tally friendly practices, using organic products, sustainable farming, and social responsibil-
ity); We Are . . . , Method, http://methodhome.com/methodology/our-story/we-are/ 
(last visited July 20, 2013) (highlighting the company’s green practices and environmental 
priorities); TOMS: Giving Report, TOMS 10, http://www.toms.com/media/TOMS_Giving_ 
Report_2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (describing how upon selling each pair of its 
shoes, TOMS will “send new pairs to our Giving Partners, who place the shoes directly on 
children’s feet as part of . . . health checkups, distribution of medicine and vaccines, mi-
crofinance programs, youth leadership activities, school support and vocational training”); 
see also J. Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson, For-Profit Social Ventures, in Social Entre-
preneurship 2, 3–5 (Marilyn L. Kourilsky & William B. Walstad eds., 2003) (describing 
how for-profit social ventures embed their social goals at various stages of their businesses). 
20 See, e.g., Our Mission, Hot Bread Kitchen, http://hotbreadkitchen.org/about-us/ 
our-mission (last visited July 20, 2013) (detailing that “Hot Bread Kitchen increases eco-
nomic security for foreign-born and low-income women and men by opening access to the 
billion dollar specialty food industry[,]” and indicating that Hot Bread Kitchen sells bread 
to offset the cost of training); Social Mission, Greyston Bakery, http://www.greyston 
bakery.com/social-mission/ (last visited July 20, 2013) (stating that Greyston Bakery aims 
to achieve “community economic renewal” and “personal transformation” of its employ-
ees); see also Dees & Anderson, supra note 19, at 4. 
21 See, e.g., C.K. Prahalad, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid 275–79 
(5th ed. 2010) (detailing a case study where a sculptor created rubber prosthetic limbs and 
purposely did not patent the product in order to ensure its availability in impoverished 
and war-torn regions); Goal, Vision, Mission and Values, E Health Point, http://ehealth 
point.com/?page_id=37 (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (describing the mission of this “sus-
tainable social business enterprise” as “[t]o provide high quality, affordable, health and 
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founders of social enterprises do not want to undertake these activities 
solely to benefit people and planet. The founders also want to hold an 
ownership stake in their ventures and to profit if their green or one-for-
one product is a sensation, if their labor force is more stable, or if their 
“bottom of the pyramid” invention becomes a staple for the millions 
who reside there.22 Social entrepreneurs pursue neither exclusively so-
cial good nor solely profit, but a “double bottom line.”23 
 This Part considers the obstacles faced by social enterprises and 
the limitations of the hybrid organizational forms meant to address 
those challenges.24 Section A explains why social enterprises lack the 
access to capital enjoyed by traditional for-profit and nonprofit ven-
tures.25 Then, Section B examines new organizational forms, offering 
an overview of three hybrid entities designed to allow social enterprises 
to take their place alongside conventional businesses and charities: 
L3Cs, benefit corporations, and flexible purpose corporations. 26  Fi-
nally, Section C takes a critical look at those hybrid entities and briefly 
considers why a different approach, such as FLY Paper, might do more 
to address social enterprise’s capital access problem.27 
A. Pushing the Boundaries 
 Social enterprise appears to be a growing trend. Efforts to blend 
business and philanthropy are widely reported in the media.28 Confer-
ences, blogs, trade associations, and consultancies dedicated to the sub-
ject continue to spring up.29 Top business schools are even creating 
                                                                                                                      
safe drinking water services in under-served communities by building and operating the 
necessary infrastructure”). 
22 Prahalad, supra note 21. at 6 (explaining that “bottom of the pyramid” is a concept 
that originally attempted to identify the poorest among us, “who are unserved or underserved 
by the large organized private sector . . .”); see, e.g., Social Mission, supra note 20 (“We operate a 
profitable business.”). 
23 See, e.g., Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility?, 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1351, 1377–78 (2011) (“[T]he social enterprise move-
ment seeks structures that would enable social entrepreneurs to create businesses that 
pursue double or triple bottom lines and not subordinate mission to profits.”). 
24 See infra notes 28–109 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 28–61 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 62–92 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 93–109 and accompanying text. 
28 See, e.g., Dan Pallotta, Why Can’t We Sell Charity Like We Sell Perfume?, Wall St. J., Sept. 
15, 2012, at C1; Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, but Can Tap Char-
ity, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2011, at B1. 
29 See, e.g., Soc. Enter. Conference, , http://socialenterpriseconference.org/ (last vis-
ited July 20, 2013); Blog, Soc. Fin., http://socialfinance.ca/blog (last visited July 20, 2013). 
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programs devoted specifically to the study of social enterprise.30 Yet so-
cial entrepreneurs and their advocates lament that the inadequacy of 
the traditional nonprofit and business forms stymies their desire to 
form social enterprises.31 Some of these concerns may reflect social en-
trepreneurs’ undue pessimism about the law, excessive optimism about 
their likely success, or both. Still, social entrepreneurs do face real ob-
stacles when they try to secure both access to capital and protection for 
social mission. 
1. Nonprofit Forms and Social Enterprise 
 Nonprofit forms provide superior protection for social mission, 
but limited access to capital. Under the “nondistribution constraint,”32 
a nonprofit’s assets must be dedicated permanently to nonprofit pur-
poses, rather than distributed to those who control the nonprofit.33  
Thus, a nonprofit social enterprise will “do good” in perpetuity; in fact, 
its social mission has virtually complete legacy protection. But, its foun-
ders cannot “do well” —at least not by taking an ownership stake in the 
entity.34 Likewise, nonprofits cannot entice non-founder investors by 
                                                                                                                      
30 See, e.g., Social Enterprise: MBA Experience, Harv. Bus. Sch., http://www.hbs.edu/social 
enterprise/mba-experience/ (last visited June 2, 2013); Public Management and Social Innova-
tion Program, Stan. Graduate Sch. of Bus., http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/mba/academics/ 
pmp.html (last visited June 2, 2013); The Social Enterprise Program at Columbia Business School, 
Colum. Bus. Sch., http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/socialenterprise (last visited July 5, 2013). 
31 William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the 
Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 817, 851 (2012) (“The sustain-
able business movement, impact investing, and social enterprise sectors are developing 
rapidly, but are constrained by an outdated legal framework that is not equipped to ac-
commodate for-profit entities whose social benefit purpose is central to their existence.”); 
Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, 10 Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev. 51, 52 
(2012) (describing the “confusing dilemma” faced by social entrepreneurs who can choose 
only from adopting a pure for-profit or pure nonprofit organizational form); Heerad 
Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov. 2011, at 99, 99 (“[S]ocially minded 
entrepreneurs end up shoehorning their vision into one structure or the other and accept-
ing burdensome trade-offs in the process.”). 
32 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 838 (1980) 
(dubbing nonprofits’ prohibition of distributing their profits as the “nondistribution con-
straint”). 
33 See id. (“A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from 
distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as 
members, officers, directors, or trustees.”); see also Revised Model Nonprofit Corpora-
tion Act §§ 1.40(10), 13.01 (1986) [hereinafter RMNCA] (prohibiting distributions, 
defined in § 1.40(10) as “the payment of a dividend or any part of the income or profit of 
a corporation to its members, directors or officers.”). 
34 See Hansmann, supra note 32, at 838. 
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offering them a profit share midstream or as residual claimants.35 If, for 
example, a low-cost water filter inventor sets up shop as a nonprofit, the 
entire net profit must be reinvested. The inventor cannot pay profits 
out to him or herself or to others as dividends or distributions.36 A 
nonprofit’s inability to raise equity investments imposes serious limita-
tions on its ability to obtain capital, especially capital needed for 
growth. 
 The potential advantages of the nonprofit form in accessing do-
nated capital37 or retaining earned income38 rarely overcome nonprof-
its’ limitations. First, funding expansion through deductible contribu-
tions and tax-exempt earned income will not be a route available to 
every social enterprise formed as a nonprofit. Tax-exemption and eligi-
bility to receive tax-deductible contributions are available only to those 
nonprofits that meet fairly exacting qualification criteria and submit to 
significant ongoing regulation.39 It will be difficult for many social en-
terprises to meet these qualification criteria, especially avoiding limits 
on commerciality. Even among those whose purposes would likely qual-
ify, many will prefer to avoid the complex web of regulations that would 
come along with favored status.40 
 Further, not all revenue earned by tax-exempt nonprofit social en-
terprises is exempt from tax.41 The unrelated business income tax ap-
plies standard income tax rates to income earned by a tax-exempt en-
tity from any active trade or business, regularly carried on, and not 
substantially related to the entity’s exempt purposes.42 Thus, even for a 
social enterprise that could obtain tax-favored status, this status will 
                                                                                                                      
35 See id. 
36  Investors may also only pay themselves or others reasonable compensation. See 
RMNCA § 13.01 cmt. (noting that “the payment of reasonable compensation for services 
rendered” will not run afoul of the nondistribution constraint (emphasis added)); Anup 
Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 Va. L. Rev. 2017, 2024 (2007) 
(noting the same limitation). 
37 If a nonprofit social enterprise qualifies to receive tax-deductible contributions, this 
tax status will help it attract donations by lowering the real cost of contributions for do-
nors. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2006). 
38 If a nonprofit social enterprise qualifies as tax-exempt, this status will allow it to keep 
that share of earnings that it would otherwise owe to the government. See id. 
39 See id. §§ 501(c)(3), 170(c). 
40 Cf. Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, supra note 5, at 2454–62 (describing the 
limitations that the binary profit versus nonprofit structures pose and the regulatory archi-
tecture that a would-be philanthropist would avoid by organizing an enterprise as a for-
profit entity). 
41 See I.R.C. § 511. 
42 See id. 
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provide only limited assistance in capital formation unless it can attract 
significant donated funds. 
 Debt financing remains available to nonprofit social enterprises, 
regardless of tax status. And debt can be an extraordinarily flexible and 
useful tool for raising capital.43 Nonprofits often, however, have diffi-
culty securing all of the debt capital they require due to their lack of an 
equity cushion, lenders’ unfamiliarity and skepticism toward nonprofit 
status, or both.44 Even when debt can be secured, nonprofits may not 
be able to fully take advantage of its benefits or its flexibility. Unconven-
tional debt instruments could easily breach the nondistribution con-
straint and consequently become just as unlawful for a nonprofit to is-
sue as common stock.45 For nonprofit social enterprises that obtain tax-
favored status, specialized debt instruments may transgress regulatory 
limits, subjecting an entity to loss of status or its founders or managers 
to penalty taxes.46 
 All other things being equal, social entrepreneurs would obviously 
like to raise tax-favored donated capital and earn tax-free income. But 
forming a social enterprise as a nonprofit will not guarantee access to 
these advantages, will impose regulatory burdens, and will seriously 
limit capital formation through equity investment and debt. Thus, al-
though nonprofit forms offer superior protection for social mission, 
their limited access to capital will often make them quite unattractive. 
2. For-Profit Forms and Social Enterprise 
 By contrast, for-profit forms are tailor-made to expand an entre-
preneur’s access to capital. Yet social entrepreneurs do not see for-
profit forms as ideal either. Social entrepreneurs recognize that for-
profit forms will allow them to “do well,” but they fear these forms will 
frustrate their capacity to “do good” by failing to protect social mis-
sion—or even betraying it. Singled out for particular derision is the for-
profit corporation and the single-minded pursuit of shareholder wealth 
                                                                                                                      
43 See infra notes 131–178 and accompanying text. 
44 Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate 
Income Taxation, 91 Yale L.J. 54, 72–73 (1981). Indeed, the federal tax exemption for non-
profit charities may be justified as a subsidy to improve nonprofits’ ability to raise capital 
through retained income. See id. at 75. 
45 Cassady V. Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors (a/k/a 
“Social Enterprise”), 38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 678, 696 (2012). 
46 See id. Part of the vast regulatory web governing tax-favored nonprofits prohibits any 
inurement of nonprofit funds to its insiders, bars substantial benefits to any private parties, 
and penalizes excessive benefits if they flow to individuals with control over the entity’s 
affairs. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4958 (2006). 
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maximization that corporate law supposedly requires.47 Social entre-
preneurs worry that this unforgiving mandate will give investors the 
ammunition to jettison their enterprises’ social mission at will.48 
 There is considerable debate over whether these concerns over 
shareholder wealth maximization are legitimate. On the one hand, the 
Supreme Court of Michigan’s 1919 decision in Dodge v. Ford has taught 
generations of lawyers that a “business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” 49  Lest one 
think this idea outdated, the Court of Chancery of Delaware decided 
eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark in 2010, reminding us that the for-
profit corporate form “is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philan-
thropic ends,” and that for-profit corporate directors must “act[] to 
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”50 
On the other hand, the corporate legal literature teems with refuta-
tions of shareholder wealth maximization as an unwavering and exclu-
sive objective.51 These accounts argue that legal doctrine requires for-
profits to view shareholder wealth maximization, on some relatively 
long-term time horizon, as only a default.52 Ford and eBay also both in-
volved potentially oppressed minority shareholders and thus may not 
be generalizable to situations without a controlling interest.53 
 The scholarship asserting a strong shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion norm also addresses the for-profit corporate setting and particu-
                                                                                                                      
47 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek 
Profit, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 135, 155 (2012) (opining that “corporate law requires di-
rectors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize 
profits for the stockholders”); see also Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law: 
Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities 41–42 (2006) (describing share-
holder primacy as a “foundational principle” that “informs every aspect of corporate and 
securities law,” and arguing more broadly that corporate law should embrace a broader 
sense of proper corporate purposes). 
48 See Dees & Battle Anderson, supra note 19, at 17–19 (describing the importance for 
social enterprises to “maintain control in sympathetic hands”). 
49 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
50 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
51 See, e.g., Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth 25–31 (2012); Einer El-
hauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 744 (2005); 
Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate 
Governance, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 987, 996–1007 (2009). 
52 Elhauge, supra note 51, at 780–81; see also Principles of Corporate Governance 
§ 2.01 reporter’s note 6 (1992) (“[T]here is little doubt that [restrictions on the general 
profit-making objective] would normally be permissible if agreed to by all the sharehold-
ers. Such an agreement might be embodied in the certificate of incorporation, or not.”). 
53 See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 
163, 167 (2008). 
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larly large, publicly held corporations. The inherent flexibility of a 
partnership, a limited liability company (“LLC”), or even a close corpo-
ration should permit entrepreneurs to bind investors to social mission 
through contractual precommitments. Additionally, any concerns re-
garding proper corporate objectives will be adjudicated only in suits 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty. There, the business judgment rule’s 
protection for any non-grossly negligent fiduciary decision,54 the seri-
ous procedural hurdles that derivative plaintiffs must clear,55 and the 
availability of opt-in charter provisions56 make concerns of legal doc-
trine forcing for-profit social enterprises to pursue profit alone seem 
outsized, at least beyond the takeover context.57 
 Nevertheless, social entrepreneurs do fear a financial success will 
make their social enterprises a ripe target for acquisition by less altruis-
tic owners. They fret that would-be acquirers will see a moderately prof-
itable social enterprise as the proverbial twenty-dollar bill lying on a 
sidewalk,58 needing only to be stripped of its irksome social mission. 
Social entrepreneurs worry that if acquirers can convince or buy off a 
social enterprise’s investors, they can take over the social enterprise and 
abandon its social purpose. 59  These challenges become particularly 
acute if a social enterprise becomes highly successful, as every fledgling 
social entrepreneur seems to believe. For-profit forms themselves pro-
vide no mechanism to protect a social enterprise’s legacy—to lock in 
social mission and prevent investors from selling out. 
 Of course, entrepreneurs can take steps to vary for-profit forms’ 
defaults to prevent investors from forcing a sell-out. They can insert pro-
tective language in organic documents. They can keep their entities 
small and allow only the like-minded to invest. Indeed, a control posi-
                                                                                                                      
54 James D. Cox & Thomas L. Hazen, Business Organizations Law 198–99 (3d ed. 
2011). 
55 Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholder Derivative Actions Law & Practice § 4:2 
(West 2012) (providing a comprehensive overview of the numerous federal and state pro-
cedural requirements shareholders must satisfy to proceed with derivative litigation). 
56 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). 
57 In the takeover context, directors of Delaware corporations must maximize “the com-
pany’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.” Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
58 See Mancur Olson, Jr., Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich, and Oth-
ers Poor, J. Econ. Persps. Spring 1996, at 3, 3 (noting the widespread faith that “the market 
typically eliminates opportunities for supranormal returns [because] big bills aren’t often 
dropped on the sidewalk, and if they are, they are picked up very quickly.”). 
59 See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corpo-
rate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 221, 234 (2012) 
(“[A] social enterprise may face a change in control transaction precisely because com-
pany earnings are not its only bottom line.”). 
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tion likely offers the best protection against suit or takeover by investors 
motivated purely by profit.60 For-profit social enterprise founders can-
not, however, protect their enterprises from the potential predations of 
their future selves.61  For instance, a malaria drug researcher herself 
could someday bow to pressure from an acquirer seeking to market the 
medicine she cultivated for aesthetic uses in the developed world. With-
out a stalwart founder, for-profit forms will not enforce commitment to 
social mission. 
 In sum, social entrepreneurs committed to “doing well by doing 
good” will find either traditional organizational pole lacking. They may 
be attracted to nonprofit forms’ ability to lock both investors and en-
trepreneurs into pursuit of social mission. But they will be dissatisfied 
with nonprofits’ limited access to capital. By contrast, social entrepre-
neurs will be keen on the broad access to capital offered by for-profit 
forms. But they will worry that for-profit forms insufficiently protect 
social mission from defection by investors, entrepreneurs, or both. 
They are left wondering “if only these attributes could be mixed and 
matched to ease capital access and to protect a legacy of social good 
. . . .” Recently, state legislatures across the U.S. have enacted legisla-
tion intended to make this dream a reality, attempting to create be-
spoke organizational forms to house social enterprises. 
B. New Organizational Forms 
 This Section will offer a brief overview of three categories of new, 
hybrid organizational forms: the L3C, the benefit corporation, and the 
FPC.62 Importantly, none of these forms attempts to massage the non-
                                                                                                                      
 
60 See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 34 (noting that if Jim and Craig, together 
the majority stockholders in craiglist.com, were “the only stockholders affected by their 
decisions, then there would be no one to object”). Of course, in the rare case that a start-
up achieves the success and scale that would propel it to issue shares widely, corporate law 
would, at least in some cases, compel directors to privilege profit over social good at points 
of conflict. See Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182 (articulating the so-called Revlon duty, which 
when triggered requires directors to act to maximize value for shareholders). 
61 Commitment devices offer one popular, but flawed, mechanism founders might 
employ to guard against future weakness. See generally Steven A. Dean, The Tax Expenditure 
Budget Is a Zombie Accountant, 46 U.C. Davis. L. Rev. 265, 272–78 (2012) (describing the 
operation of commitment devices). 
62 The discussion here is limited to three types of domestic forms, though others not 
necessarily within the three archetypes are also available abroad. See, e.g., Dana Brakman 
Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 619, 630–36 (2010) 
(analyzing the United Kingdom’s community interest company); Matthew F. Doeringer, 
Note, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International Analysis, 20 Duke J. Comp. & 
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distribution constraint or the restrictions on tax-exempt entities while 
retaining their access to tax-deductible contributions.63 Rather, each 
modifies a taxable, for-profit entity to enable and protect social mission 
while still providing access to equity and other sources of capital. Forms 
taking these general types have now been authorized by a significant 
number of jurisdictions in the United States.64 Although enacting legis-
latures often vary their versions quite a bit from that of the first-mover, 
the similarities within the three categories are sufficient to properly 
speak of them as archetypes. 
1. The L3C 
 Vermont adopted enabling legislation for the first specialized or-
ganizational form for social enterprise in a brief 2008 L3C statute. The 
L3C starts with the LLC’s highly contractual framework and then 
tweaks it to add the idea of a dual mission. Unlike an LLC, which “may 
have any lawful purpose,”65 a Vermont L3C is formed “for a business 
purpose” but must “significantly further[] the accomplishment of one 
or more charitable or educational purposes” under the federal tax code 
and “would not have been formed but for the company’s relationship 
                                                                                                                      
Int’l L. 291, 308–15 (2010) (describing the Belgian Société à Finalité Sociale and the 
United Kingdom’s approach to social enterprise). 
63 Of course, it would be impossible for a state organizational form to change the fed-
eral tax requirements for tax exemption and eligibility to receive tax-deductible charitable 
contributions. 
64 Over one third of jurisdictions have adopted legislation permitting hybrid organiza-
tions. See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 2500–3503 (West 2013) (California’s FPC statute); Laws, 
Americans for Community Dev., http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/laws. 
html (last visited July 21, 2013) (listing nine states and two Native American tribes with 
L3C statutes); State by State Legislative Status, Benefit Corp Info. Center, http://www. 
benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited June 26, 2013) (listing eighteen 
states with benefit corporation statutes); see also 79 Del. Laws ch. 122, § 8 (2013) (adding 
Sections 361–368 to the Delaware General Corporation Law to create a “public benefit 
corporation,” which shares some attributes of the FPC); 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 100 
(S.B. 849) (West) (Texas’s new “flexible purpose corporation” statute, which does not re-
semble the California model at all); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23B.25.020 to .040 (West 
2013) (Washington’s social purpose corporation legislation, which resembles California’s 
FPC legislation in some respects). 
65 Revised Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 104 (2006) [hereinafter Revised LLC Act]. 
Eight states have enacted the Revised LLC Act. Legislative Fact Sheet—Limited Liability Company 
(Revised), Unif. L. Comm’n, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title= 
Limited%20Liability%20Company%20(Revised) (last visited June 11, 2013). Although the 
Revised LLC Act states that an LLC may have “any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for 
profit,” its predecessor stated only that an LLC may have “any lawful purpose.” Unif. Ltd. 
Liab. Co. Act § 112 (1996). 
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to the accomplishment of charitable or educational purposes.”66 In ad-
dition, 
[n]o significant purpose of the company is the production of 
income or the appreciation of property; provided, however, 
that the fact that [an L3C] produces significant income or 
capital appreciation shall not, in the absence of other factors, 
be conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the 
production of income or the appreciation of property.67 
For-profits formed as L3Cs may thus pursue social mission along with 
profits for equity investors. 
 L3C statutes, however, offer little protection for social mission 
legacy. If, at any point, an L3C no longer satisfies the purpose re-
quirements, it will automatically transform into a standard LLC.68 No 
investors need approve, and no regulator need decide whether the 
requirements cease to be satisfied.69 The entity simply and automati-
cally transforms into a fully for-profit LLC, and its assets, fiduciaries, 
and managers remain unchanged. To illustrate, imagine that a job-
training social entrepreneur sets up a bakery as an L3C. One day, the 
entrepreneur or a successor decides to fire the workforce of unskilled 
new immigrants and halt their training. The following day, the entity 
could hire a crew of expert and more productive bakers. Overnight, it 
would have transformed from a bakery and job training social enter-
prise into a standard-issue bakery. It would also shift from an L3C to a 
standard-issue for-profit LLC. There might be community outcry or 
bad press over this move, but legally, there would be no fanfare at all. 
                                                                                                                      
66 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (2012). 
67 Id. § 3001(27)(B). Although the idea of business purpose is not retained in all subse-
quent L3C enactments, see, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:1302(A) (2012), they use the ideas 
of significantly furthering charitable or educational purposes and but-for cause. See, e.g., Me. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, § 1611(1) (2012); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 57C-2-01(d)(1) (West 
2012). L3Cs also permit income production or capital appreciation to occur but prohibit it as 
a significant purpose of an L3C. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 7-16-76(b)(1) (West 2012); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-412(1)(b)(iii), 48-2c-412(3) (West 2012). 
68 See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(D); see also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, 
§ 1611(1) (“A company that no longer satisfies the requirements of this section continues 
to exist as a limited liability company and shall promptly amend its certificate of formation 
so that its name and purpose no longer identify it as a low-profit limited liability company, 
L3C or l3C.”). 
69 See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(D) (not including any requirements for ap-
proval). 
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2. The Benefit Corporation 
 Following swiftly on the heels of the L3C’s enactment, in 2010 
Maryland adopted first-in-the-nation legislation enabling a second type 
of hybrid form: the benefit corporation.70 The benefit corporation be-
gins with a corporate law framework, varying a few key components to 
accommodate the mission-based concerns of social entrepreneurs.71  
For example, the Maryland statute requires a benefit corporation to 
have a “material, positive impact on society and the environment.”72 
 One of the major innovations of the benefit corporation form is 
how this impact is measured. An entity’s public benefit must be meas-
ured with respect to a third-party standard, meaning “a standard for de-
fining, reporting, and assessing best practices in corporate social and 
environmental performance” that is publicly available and developed by 
a party unrelated to the benefit corporation using the standard.73 Some 
benefit corporation statutes further require third-party standards to be 
“comprehensive” and “credible,” but none establishes a mechanism for 
screening or monitoring the content of third-party standards.74  Fur-
                                                                                                                      
70 B Lab, Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CSRwire 
(Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-
State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation. 
71 See Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01(b) (West 2012) (defining a ”benefit 
corporation” as “a Maryland corporation that elects to be a benefit corporation”). 
72 Id. § 5-6C-01(c). 
73 Id. § 5-6C-01(e); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-1 (West 2011) (providing a third-
party standard for “defining, reporting and assessing corporate social and environmental 
performance” developed by an independent party through transparent measures); Vt. Stat. 
Ann. § 21.03(a)(8) (same); Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, supra note 
14, at 729 (describing this innovation); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enter-
prise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 22, 30 (2012) (dis-
cussing benefit corporations’ third-party standard). 
74 Compare Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(g)(1) (West 2012) (including a comprehensive-
ness requirement), Haw. Rev. Stat. § 420D-12(1) (2012) (same), 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
40/1.10 (2012) (same), La. Rev. Stat. § 1803(A)(12)(a) (2012) (including a comprehen-
siveness requirement, though not styled as such), 2012 Mass. Legis. Serv. 964 (West) (in-
cluding comprehensiveness and credibility requirements), and H.B. 4766, 119th Cong. 
2nd Reg. Sess. § 33-38-130(A)(9)(a) (S.C. 2012) (enacted) (including a comprehensive-
ness requirement), with Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01(e) (requiring only 
transparency and independence), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-1 (same), N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law 
§ 1702(g) (McKinney 2012) (same), Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-782 (2012) (same), and Vt. 
Stat. Ann. § 21.03(a)(8) (same). The comprehensiveness requirement requires that the 
third-party standard consist of a “comprehensive assessment of the impact of the business 
and the business's operations” on the established goals of the business. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. 
Code § 14601(g)(1). The “credible” aspect of the third-party standard ensures that the 
report is “credible because the standard is developed by a person that: (i) has access to 
necessary expertise to assess overall corporate social and environmental performance; and 
(ii) uses a balanced multi-stakeholder approach.” 2012 Mass. Legis. Serv. 964. 
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thermore, establishing an entity as a benefit corporation is an almost 
entirely self-service affair. The entity first selects a third-party standard. 
Then, the entity itself must judge whether it creates a material, positive 
impact on society and the environment under the standard it selects. If 
an entity finds itself in compliance with this metric, it may register as a 
benefit corporation. 
 Benefit corporation statutes also explicitly reject shareholder 
wealth maximization.75 Going even further than a standard constitu-
ency statute’s permissive approach, benefit corporation statutes require 
directors to consider the impact of their decisions on employees of the 
corporation, its subsidiaries and suppliers, “customers [to the extent 
they are] beneficiaries of the general or specific public benefit pur-
poses of the benefit corporation,” the community, society, and the local 
and global environment.76 Although shareholders are empowered to 
enforce directors’ obligations,77 the expansive set of stakeholder inter-
ests that benefit corporation directors must consider will make their 
decisions virtually unreviewable.78 If and when shareholders challenge 
                                                                                                                      
 
75  See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 420D-5(c) (identifying “general and specific public 
benefits” as being in the best interest of the corporation); Md. Code Ann., Corps. & 
Ass’ns § 5-6-C-06 (indicating that “[e]ach benefit corporation shall have the purpose of 
creating a general public benefit” and that “[t]he creation of a general public benefit or 
specific public benefit . . . is in the best interests of the benefit corporation”). 
76  See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-07(a)(1); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14A:18-6(a). 
77 In fact, benefit corporation statutes often state specifically that no new potential 
plaintiffs beyond shareholders will have standing to challenge fiduciaries’ actions. See, e.g., 
805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 40/4.01(d) (“A director does not have a duty to a person that is a 
beneficiary of the general public benefit purpose or a specific public benefit purpose of a 
benefit corporation arising from the status of the person as a beneficiary.”); Mass. Gen. 
Laws. Ann. ch. 156E, § 10(e) (West 2012) (“A director shall not have a fiduciary duty to a 
person that is a beneficiary of the general or specific public benefit purposes of a benefit 
corporation arising from the status of the person as a beneficiary.”). New experimental 
findings suggest that siting enforcement with shareholders alone will undermine statutory 
mandates requiring directors to consider multiple constituencies in making corporate 
decisions. See Sven Fischer et al., Cui Bono, Benefit Corporation? An Experiment Inspired by So-
cial Enterprise Legislation in Germany and the US, Max Plank Inst. for Res. on Collective 
Goods 2–3 (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2013_04online.pdf. 
78 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Social Enterprise?, 
46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 591, 599–600 (2011). A similar criticism is often laid at the feet of 
constituency statutes, which merely permit, but do not require, directors to consider the 
interests of various constituencies. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: 
The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1493 
(1992) (“[T]he primary effect of these constituency statutes is simply to enhance manag-
ers’ discretion in responding to hostile takeover bids.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical 
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 582 
(1992) (“[B]y acknowledging the interests of other corporate constituents, constituency 
statutes diminish the board’s accountability to stockholders . . . .”); Rima Fawal Hartman, 
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a fiduciary’s decision, the fiduciary can likely avoid liability by explain-
ing that the decision was intended to improve the lot of some other 
constituency. The statute ensures that benefit corporation directors will 
have a long list of such constituencies at the ready.79 
 Unlike L3Cs, benefit corporations face some barriers to shedding 
their social mission. To transform a benefit corporation into a standard 
for-profit one, its directors must propose an article amendment or 
transaction with that effect and shareholders must approve it by a su-
permajority vote. 80  A water filtration social entrepreneur could not 
switch production from super-low-cost filter units to high-end bidets 
without board approval and a decisive shareholder vote. Investors could, 
however, make this move over the entrepreneur’s objections, provided 
insurgents control enough shares to shift the board to their viewpoint. 
The newly sympathetic board could then endorse a change of purpose 
and present it to shareholders for their approval. Either way, if enough 
investors want to change status, the assets and goodwill of a benefit cor-
poration can be shifted to purely for-profit purposes without any regula-
tory oversight or other outside review. 
                                                                                                                      
Note, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate Directors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless 
Ideals?, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1761, 1763 (1993) (“By allowing but not requiring corpo-
rate directors to consider the interests of nonshareholders, and by not identifying situa-
tions in which directors should give special consideration to particular groups’ interests, 
the majority of [constituency] statutes actually serve to expand directorial discretion.”). 
79 Benefit corporation directors are also granted immunity from liability when they act in 
furtherance of these purposes. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-07(c) (West 
Supp. 2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-6(c) (West 2011). In addition, benefit corporation 
legislation relies heavily on the power of disclosure. A benefit corporation must annually 
report to its shareholders and publicize, among other things, how it pursued public benefit 
and an assessment of its performance. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 14630(a)–(c); N.Y. Bus. 
Corp. Law § 1708(a)–(c). Some versions of the statute also require benefit corporations to 
seat special benefit directors or officers to monitor these reports. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14A:18-7(a) (West 2011). They also create a new benefit enforcement proceeding in which 
to enforce “[t]he duties of directors and officers . . . and the general and any specific public 
benefit purpose of a benefit corporation . . . .” See id. § 14A:18-10(a); see also Haw. Rev. 
Stat. § 420D-7(c) (requiring the director’s report to include ways in which the benefit cor-
poration, its officers, or its directors failed to comply with requirements under the statute); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 33-38-410(c) (2012) (requiring that the director’s annual report include 
information as to whether the directors complied with the statute and a description of any 
failures to comply). 
80 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 14604 (West 2012); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156E, 
§ 6; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-4. A supermajority vote generally requires two-thirds of the 
shareholders to vote in favor of the change. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156E § 2; 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-1. 
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3. The Flexible Purpose Corporation 
 California pioneered the latest type of hybrid organization with 
the FPC legislation effective in January 2012.81 Again, this is a modified 
corporate form, but with some important distinctions from the benefit 
corporation. An FPC is instructed to pursue objectives beyond share-
holder wealth maximization, but these objectives need not be vetted for 
compliance with a third-party standard.82 Rather, the founders of each 
FPC select the entity’s special purpose or purposes from a broad range 
of possibilities permitted by the statute and simply state those purposes 
in the charter.83 Under the California statute, permissible special pur-
poses include: 
(A) One or more charitable or public purpose activities that a 
nonprofit public benefit corporation is authorized to carry 
out, or 
(B) The purpose of promoting positive short-term or long-
term effects of, or minimizing adverse short-term or long-term 
effects of, the flexible purpose corporation’s activities upon 
any of the following: 
(i) The flexible purpose corporation’s employees, suppli-
ers, customers, and creditors. 
  (ii) The community and society. 
  (iii) The environment.84 
 The FPC statute also varies directors’ duties from a real or per-
ceived norm of shareholder wealth maximization alone.85 Directors are 
permitted, but importantly not required, to consider “factors, as the 
director deems relevant, including the short-term and long-term pros-
pects of the flexible purpose corporation, the best interests of the flexi-
                                                                                                                      
81 Two New Types of Corporations effective January 1, 2012, Sec. of St., St. of Calif. (Dec. 14, 
2011), http://www.sos.ca.gov/business/be/forms/flexible-purpose-corp-and-benefit-corp.pdf. 
See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing: Flexible Purpose Corporations, 2 Am. U. Bus. 
L. Rev. 55 (2012) (describing and critiquing this latest social enterprise form). 
82 See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 2602(b)(2) (describing the corporate purposes that may be 
included in the articles of incorporation), 2700(c) (setting forth factors other than share-
holder wealth maximization directors may consider), 3500(b)(4) (requiring the corpora-
tion to disclose in an annual report the process for selecting evaluation measurements and 
the measurements selected). 
83 Id. § 2602(b)(2). 
84 Id. § 2602(b)(2)(A)–(B). 
85 See id. § 2700(c) (indicating that directors may consider the “purposes of the flexi-
ble purpose corporation as set forth in its articles” along with the interest of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders). 
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ble purpose corporation and its shareholders, and the purposes of the 
flexible purpose corporation as set forth in its articles.”86 Like in bene-
fit corporations, directors have broad immunity for actions taken in 
furtherance of these objectives and only shareholders have standing to 
challenge directorial actions.87 
 The FPC form also imposes slightly different limits on exit than do 
benefit corporations. An FPC must obtain a two-thirds vote of the out-
standing shares of each class of its shares to approve article amend-
ments that would “materially alter any special purpose of the flexible 
purpose corporation stated in the articles” or to approve transactions 
with similar effects.88 This language places identical limits on wholesale 
abandonment of FPC status to those in most benefit corporation stat-
utes.89 It also, however, requires board and shareholder approval for 
changes of special purpose even if a new special purpose would still 
qualify the entity as an FPC.90 Shareholders would have to approve a 
change from producing organic baby food to green power as well as 
from organic baby food to pink slime.91 Still, FPC statutes impose only a 
procedural hurdle for shareholders. Investors controlling sufficient 
shares may abandon or change social purpose with or without the en-
trepreneur’s agreement, without regulatory involvement, and without 
any impact on its assets or personnel.92 
C. Life on the Frontier 
 Five years and dozens of enactments later, multiple specialized 
forms are now available to house social enterprises. As for-profit entities 
with no legal restrictions on their access to capital, these entities can al-
                                                                                                                      
86 Cal. Corp. Code § 2700(c) (West 2012). 
87 Id. § 2700(d)–(e). FPC statutes also require adopting entities to make comprehen-
sive annual disclosures to their shareholders and the public, addressing both financial 
achievements and progress on social mission. Id. § 3500. 
88 Id. § 3000(b). The statute includes analogous protections for mergers, and reor-
ganizations. See id. §§ 3201 (addressing mergers), 3401 (addressing reorganizations). 
89 Compare Cal. Corp. Code §§ 3001, 3002 (providing procedure for converting an 
FPC to a nonprofit or cooperative corporation and a domestic corporation, respectively), 
and id. § 3000(b) (detailing voting procedures with regard to passing amendments), with 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156E, § 6 (West 2012) (permitting a benefit corporation to 
terminate its status through an amendment to its articles of organization), and N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 14A:18-4 (West 2011) (indicating that a benefit corporation can terminate its status 
subject to amending its certificate of incorporation). 
90 Cal. Corp. Code § 3000(b). 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
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low their founders and others to “do well.”93 By requiring their adopters 
to make claims to pursuing social goals, they simultaneously create an 
expectation that these enterprises will “do good.” 94  The new forms 
carve out space in the legal and economic landscape for mission-driven 
enterprises with equity-like capital structures; that expressive victory is 
no small accomplishment.95 Yet none of the forms thus far developed 
sufficiently protects social mission to attract capital from investors and 
interest from entrepreneurs. This Section describes the weaknesses 
unique to each form and briefly notes the general problems with using 
organizational form to meet the desires of social entrepreneurs.96 
1. Entities and Enforcement 
 The new hybrid forms provide limited mechanisms to enforce 
their technically required social missions when legacy is at stake. L3C 
statutes require these entities “to significantly further . . . a charitable or 
educational purpose[,]” but they do not state that these purposes must 
be primary or prioritized.97 Although “[n]o significant purpose of the 
company” may be “the production of income or the appreciation of 
property,”98 individual decisions to pursue profit over social good seem 
permissible. So long as the overall charitable and educational purpose 
remains significantly furthered by the company in general, the statute’s 
purpose requirements have been met.99 Not every commentator would 
agree with this interpretation.100 Even assuming, arguendo, that an en-
tity must prioritize social good as long as it remains an L3C, an entre-
                                                                                                                      
93 See, e.g., id. § 2602 (FPC); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B) (West 2012) (L3C); 
Va. Code Ann. §§ 13.1-626, 13.1-782 (2012) (benefit corporation). 
94 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 2602(b)(2)(A)–(B) (West 2013) (mandating that an 
FPC state its “special purposes” in the charter); Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-
01(c) (West Supp. 2012) (defining a benefit corporation as having a “material, positive 
impact on society and the environment”); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 57C-2-01(d)(1) (requir-
ing L3Cs to have “charitable or educational purposes”). 
95 Allowing social entrepreneurs to signal their commitment to pursuing a double bot-
tom line to their customers—facilitating more sales and higher profits—may actually help 
them meet that commitment. 
96 See infra notes 97–109 and accompanying text. 
97 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A). 
98 Id. § 3001(27)(B) (emphasis added). 
99 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (West 2012). 
100 One scholar who disagrees, for example, argues that L3C fiduciaries’ decisions 
must always be made to further charitable and educational goals over profit-oriented ones, 
as “the L3C statutes clearly impose an unambiguous ordering of fiduciary priorities.” John 
Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties 
and Accountability, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 117, 141 (2010). This Article disagrees that the statutes 
offer such clarity, and the matter has yet to be litigated. 
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preneur running an L3C may transform the entity into an ordinary 
LLC if the opportunity to sacrifice social good for profit is too enticing. 
An entrepreneur need not obtain the approval of the L3C’s investors to 
do so, and the transformed now-LLC will take all of the L3C’s assets.101 
The sole penalty will be the loss of the L3C moniker.102 Thus, the L3C 
form offers investors no protection for legacy. 
 Benefit corporation statutes instead empower investors with ulti-
mate control over enforcing social mission and legacy, but they leave 
entrepreneurs’ commitments to social mission unprotected. Midstream, 
fiduciaries are given wide discretion to self-regulate, complemented by 
serious disclosure obligations. Third-party standard setters play a sup-
porting role, but they do not engage directly in social mission enforce-
ment. Fundamentally, shareholders are charged with enforcement, and 
it remains to be seen how much enforcement these investors can and 
will supply. 
 Benefit corporations also impose only marginally greater legacy 
protection than disfavored traditional for-profit entities. The statutes 
prevent entrepreneurs from abandoning their social missions over 
shareholder objections. 103  But benefit corporation shareholders de-
termined to pursue profit alone can transform their entities unilater-
ally.104 They can elect a new board, approve amendments to the charter 
or strategic transactions, or combine these tactics to oust a recalcitrant 
founder. If two-thirds of a benefit corporation’s shareholders favor such 
a change, a committed entrepreneur is powerless to stop it. 
 FPC statutes too rely on fiduciaries and investors to preserve an 
FPC’s social mission. Directors again have great discretion. Sharehold-
ers alone can litigate midstream decisions to forsake social mission, 
guided by annual disclosures of each entity’s special purpose triumphs 
and failures.105 Again, like a benefit corporation, legacy protection is 
one-sided. For entrepreneurs to move an FPC away from its social mis-
sion, even to another purpose also furthering social good, they will 
need to win shareholders’ support.106 But FPC shareholders possess the 
power to shift or abandon social mission unilaterally, and enough moti-
vated FPC shareholders can push past any founder’s opposition.107 
                                                                                                                      
101 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
103 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
104 See id. 
105 See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 2700(e)–(f), 3500 (West 2012). 
106 See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
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2. The Credibility Gap 
 Despite their claims to offer an ideal legal form for social enter-
prise, current hybrids fall short of social entrepreneurs’ desires. All en-
able socially motivated entrepreneurs to found entities claiming a social 
mission and permit them to raise equity capital to support and scale 
them. Still, these forms offer only scattershot enforcement; they all 
leave a social enterprise’s legacy vulnerable to unilateral abandonment 
by either investors or entrepreneurs acting alone. 
 Hybrid entities do attempt to constrain midstream decisions re-
garding an enterprise’s operations—FLY Paper does not. Instead, FLY 
Paper limits entrepreneurs’ capacity to benefit by sacrificing mission in 
favor of increased profitability. As a practical matter, when considering 
the few enforcement mechanisms policing midstream decision making 
in the new hybrid organizational forms, the fact that FLY Paper does 
not address this problem leaves it at no serious comparative disadvan-
tage.108 From the outset, the mere novelty of new hybrid forms may fur-
ther frustrate their adopters’ ability to access capital markets. Even so-
phisticated investors like venture capital firms tend to favor well-known 
legal forms, such as the familiar Delaware corporation.109 Perhaps this 
problem can be overcome through education or marketing, but even 
then, other obstacles would remain. 
 In particular, hybrid forms’ failure to protect social mission poses a 
more enduring barrier to investors’ capital and entrepreneurs’ interest. 
Unlike customers—who can simply cease patronizing a restaurant that 
abandons its L3C status—investors that value a double bottom line over 
their own financial interests would be foolish to rely on an entrepre-
neur’s promises. For precisely that reason, entrepreneurs unable to 
provide a credible signal of their commitments to a double bottom line 
will find it difficult to attract capital from those investors. Without a 
credible signal of investors’ commitment, wizened entrepreneurs 
should likewise be wary of the benefit corporation or FPC form. Either 
                                                                                                                      
108 See generally Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, supra note 14 (dis-
cussing the lack of enforcement of dual mission in midstream decision making under the 
L3C, benefit corporation, and FPC forms). 
109 Due in part to the view that “sophisticated investors are not likely to experiment 
with organizational innovations that carry uncertain consequences,” venture capitalists 
continue to choose the corporate entity over alternatives, despite favorable tax and flexi-
bility attributes of other forms. See Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s 
Guide to Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 Ark. L. Rev. 773, 804 (2004) (quoting Deborah 
A. DeMott, Agency and the Unincorporated Firm: Reflections on Design on the Same Plane of Inter-
est, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 595, 609, 611 (1997)). 
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one ultimately leaves entrepreneurs’ legacy in the hands of investors, 
whose true preferences might be hidden or easily manipulated. 
II. FLY Paper 
 In two respects, FLY Paper represents a sharp break from efforts to 
bring social investors and entrepreneurs together by creating new or-
ganizational forms. First, by making the standard Delaware corporation 
safe for social enterprise, FLY Paper obviates the need for L3Cs, benefit 
corporations, or FPCs.110 Second, FLY Paper recognizes that the rela-
tionship between investors and entrepreneurs—rather than the organ-
izational forms available to them—will determine the fate of their dual 
mission. 
 This Part describes how FLY Paper goes further than other hybrids 
to secure an enterprise’s social mission. FLY Paper investors cannot 
compel entrepreneurs to abandon their social purpose because they 
hold debt, not equity.111 Entrepreneurs cannot succumb to the tempta-
tion to abandon their social purpose without handing the lion’s share 
of resulting gains to investors. This is because investors have the power 
to convert their FLY Paper into equity on favorable terms should entre-
preneurs sell their stock.112 By jointly embracing those limitations, in-
vestors and entrepreneurs credibly signal their commitment to pursu-
ing a double bottom line. 
 Section A of this Part examines social enterprise’s capital access 
problem through the lens of game theory, discussing the assurance 
game that results when investors and entrepreneurs attempt to balance 
                                                                                                                      
110 Although the following discussion assumes the social enterprise issuing FLY Paper will 
be a conventional corporation—a reasonable assumption given the popularity of the corpo-
rate form—a limited partnership or limited liability company would work equally well. 
111 By contrast, shareholders in benefit corporations can vote to set aside the social 
mission. This action may require two steps, first an ouster of uncooperative directors and 
then a vote to abandon social mission. Shareholders, however, can make this decision on 
their own. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
112 An L3C’s managers can abandon the enterprise’s social mission at any time. See su-
pra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. Additional protections would have to be included 
in a FLY Paper indenture and associated documentation, preventing excessive compensa-
tion, dividends, the use of the enterprise’s equity as collateral for shareholder loans, or 
other equity-depleting maneuvers. As Professor Brian Galle notes, “[A] founder could 
cause the firm to issue high-interest, subordinated debt, and use the proceeds to issue 
herself dividends.” Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 
Nov. 2013). Fortunately, this is a problem faced by every lender rather than one specific to 
FLY Paper or even to social enterprise. Measures used to “reduce the potential for oppor-
tunistic behavior by junior security holders . . . commonly take[] the form of contractual 
limitations expressed . . . in the bond indenture . . . .” Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. 
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 614 (1984). 
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profit and social good.113 Then, Section B describes FLY Paper, a novel 
solution to their dilemma that appropriates the hybrid financial instru-
ment for the ninety-nine percent.114 
A. Game Theory and Social Enterprise 
 Arming investors or entrepreneurs with tools designed with a dou-
ble bottom line in mind is no different than providing would-be stag 
hunters with weapons ideally suited to a stag hunt. Unless each has con-
fidence that his counterpart will let a hare pass him by, he would be fool-
ish to do so himself.115 For the hunters, even the most skillfully crafted 
weapon will not supply the mutual trust they lack. By allowing both in-
vestors and entrepreneurs to credibly signal their commitment to the 
double bottom line, FLY Paper supplies that critical missing element. 
1. Stag Hunt 
 The stag hunt or assurance game recognizes that—notwithstanding 
the virtues of rugged individualism—some enterprises simply cannot 
succeed without teamwork.116 To catch the stag, both hunters need to 
remain committed to the hunt. For that to be true, each needs to be 
confident that they will not find themselves alone at the moment when 
the stag appears.117 
 Unlike in the more well-known prisoners’ dilemma game, in which 
at most one prisoner can go free, both players in a stag hunt can share 
the ultimate prize.118 They will not do so, however, unless each can be 
                                                                                                                      
113 See infra notes 115–130 and accompanying text. 
114 See infra notes 131–178 and accompanying text. 
115 See infra notes 116–130 and accompanying text (describing the stag hunt and apply-
ing it to social enterprises). 
116 The stag hunt or assurance game can be traced back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
Baird et al., supra note 8, at 49. 
117 The stag hunter’s dilemma, like all two party games, is traditionally represented as a 
“bimatrix.” See id. at 303 (defining a bimatrix as “the standard way of illustrating” a game 
“in which there are two players and each has a small number of strategies”). Here, a bima-
trix would illustrate why although both hunters would prefer to jointly catch a stag, they 
fear being left with no prize at all if they pursue a stag while the other defects. If they are 
unable to credibly signal their commitment to the stag hunt, each will simply hunt hare on 
his own. 
118 In the prisoners’ dilemma, the prosecutor has enough evidence to convict both 
prisoners of a minor offense. See McAdams, supra note 10, at 215. Even if both prisoners 
refuse to cooperate, each will nevertheless be convicted and serve a short prison sentence. 
Id. The prisoners’ dilemma is often misdescribed, however, so that silence from both pris-
oners will allow them both to go free. Id. at 217–18. 
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sure that he is not being naive by pursuing the stag.119 The problem in 
a nutshell is that each hunter wants to know the intentions of the other 
in order to plan the hunter’s own actions accordingly. Unfortunately, 
knowing what weapon a hunter wields is no substitute for knowing pre-
cisely how he will use it. In game theory terms, his intentions are “pri-
vate, nonverifiable information” and remain so whether he holds a bow 
and arrow, a spear, or a gun.120 
 The hybrid entities described above only provide entrepreneurs 
(in the case of the L3C) or investors (in the case of the benefit corpora-
tion and FPC) with weapons tailored to the pursuit of a double bottom 
line.121 Of course, no matter how well-suited to nurturing social enter-
prise, none of them reveals the true intentions of the parties. Investing 
in an L3C reveals that an investor is serious about pursuing a double 
bottom line, just like helming a benefit corporation or FPC does the 
same for an entrepreneur—but that signaling is not enough.122 Should 
an entrepreneur decide to cast aside L3C status in favor of a traditional 
LLC, for instance, investors would essentially find themselves on a stag 
hunt alone.123 
 Without confidence that the founder of an L3C, or the sharehold-
ers of a benefit corporation or FPC, will remain committed to a double 
bottom line, investors will remain wary of L3Cs, while entrepreneurs 
will do the same for benefit corporations and FPCs. Either would end 
the stag hunt before it begins. What both need—and what FLY Paper 
                                                                                                                      
119 The hunters could use any number of techniques in their effort not to be duped. 
Each might, for instance, ensure that the other sports a weapon ideally suited to a stag 
hunt. Even that would be insufficient. A hunter could decide to pursue a hare even though 
his weapon is a poor match for small game. Alternatively, he might have concealed other 
weapons nearby. 
120 Solomon, for example, needed to decide which would-be parent was telling the 
truth, but the true feelings of the claimants was “private nonverifiable information.” See 
Baird et al., supra note 8, at 122 (using the biblical story of Solomon to illustrate the 
concept of private nonverifiable information). The fact that such “information is only 
revealed by the actions that individuals take” makes it essential to rely on inferences when 
making judgments about individuals’ likely actions. Id. 
121 The L3C situates control over pursuing or abandoning social mission in the hands 
of the entrepreneur. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. The benefit corpora-
tion gives that power to the shareholders. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
122 It might be optimistic to believe that benefit corporations and FPCs allow entre-
preneurs to send a credible signal regarding their intent to pursue a double bottom line. 
That would be true only if investors can successfully enforce the dual mission. There is 
good reason to doubt that they can. See, e.g., Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social 
Enterprise, supra note 14, at 705–17 (describing the obstacles to shareholder enforcement of 
social mission in flexible purpose and benefit corporations). 
123 The same is true for the entrepreneur if the shareholders decide to abandon bene-
fit corporation or FPC status. 
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provides—is a means of credibly signaling their shared commitment to 
a double bottom line.124 
2. Social Enterprise’s Double Bottom Line 
 Hybrid organizational forms can be thought of as an effort to help 
the stag hunt succeed. Rather than resolving the tension between inves-
tors and entrepreneurs over how to balance social and financial returns, 
those hybrid forms simply bolster the arsenal they wield. For example, 
by requiring a shareholder vote to authorize changes in its social mis-
sion benefit corporations and FPCs empower investors to police entre-
preneurs’ commitment to the social mission.125 That, of course, leaves 
entrepreneurs at the mercy of shareholders should they decide to aban-
don benefit corporation or FPC status.126 
 FLY Paper employs a fundamentally different strategy. Rather than 
becoming owners of a hybrid entity, investors become the owners of a 
hybrid debt instrument with only the rights expressly granted by its 
terms. The primary right would be to receive a modest, potentially de-
ferred financial return.127 The other would be the power to preserve 
their promised social return by commandeering the ill-gotten gains of 
entrepreneurs that abandon their principles to sell their shares.128 
 Part I catalogued the shortcomings of the hybrid entities designed 
for social enterprise. Fortunately, their failures point the way towards a 
less radical solution. Specifically, recognizing that entrepreneurs and 
investors confront a stag hunt scenario reveals why hybrid entities have 
failed to achieve their objective. Each entity attempts to create a mecha-
                                                                                                                      
124 See Baird et al., supra note 8, at 123 (explaining the role of signaling in overcom-
ing obstacles presented by private nonverifiable information). 
125 Although shareholders vote on these changes, they cannot propose them. Any such 
proposal must originate with the board. Of course, shareholders elect the board and can 
use that power to ensure that such a proposal is presented for their approval. 
126 Conversely, the L3C grants entrepreneurs the power to keep investors in line. See 
supra notes 68–69. Put differently, L3Cs and benefit corporations are commitment devices. 
Just as drinkers might hand their car keys to a sober friend to ensure they will not drive 
drunk, social entrepreneurs signal their rejection of pure profit seeking by choosing a 
hybrid organizational form. Unfortunately, L3Cs are relatively flimsy commitment devices. 
Unlike an army burning the bridge they might retreat across, an L3C does little to dis-
courage an entrepreneur’s retreat. See Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to 
It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1751, 1761–63 (2003) 
(explaining how an army can gain a strategic advantage by eliminating some of its op-
tions). Were an entrepreneur to abandon an L3C’s social mission, the only sanction would 
be the loss of the L3C designation. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
127 See infra text accompanying notes 139–140. 
128 See infra text accompanying notes 140–141. 
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nism to make an enterprise’s commitment to its social mission verifiable 
but, unsurprisingly, none succeeds.129 
 An enterprise’s commitment can be no more robust than that of 
the entrepreneurs and investors controlling it. The true commitment 
of each is “private, nonverifiable information that neither the other 
party nor any third party can acquire directly.”130 Hybrid entities repre-
sent a fruitless effort to render nonverifiable information verifiable. 
 As with the would-be stag hunters—capable of jointly hunting a 
stag or individually catching a hare—investors and entrepreneurs need 
a means to credibly signal their commitment to their common goal. 
Just as the hunters would prefer the stag, but face the risk that the 
other hunter will abandon pursuit of the stag should the opportunity to 
catch a hare arise, investors and entrepreneurs would prefer to pursue 
a double bottom line. FLY Paper offers each a way to reassure the other 
that they will not abandon the hunt. 
 FLY Paper makes investors mere lenders, allowing the entrepre-
neur to retain control over the enterprise and its social mission. By ced-
ing that control while accepting a modest financial yield on their in-
vestment, FLY Paper purchasers demonstrate their commitment to the 
double bottom line. An entrepreneur signals commitment by handing 
investors a cudgel they can use if the entrepeneur attempts to defect. A 
FLY Paper purchase provides both entrepreneurs and investors with the 
confidence to pursue the stag. 
B. Financing Social Enterprise 
 In their need for capital, social entrepreneurs are no different 
than their charitable and profit-maximizing counterparts.131 In another 
                                                                                                                      
 
129 The complex third-party verification mechanism that benefit corporations employ 
as well as the “rigorous level of disclosure” that California’s FPC statute requires are exam-
ples of how hybrid entities fail in making social missions verifiable. See supra notes 73–74, 
87 and accompanying text. The sophisticated mechanisms each employ suggest that con-
clusively demonstrating an enterprise’s commitment to a double bottom line represents an 
engineering challenge. The benefit corporation could be seen as an elaborate lie detector, 
designed to ensure that entrepreneurs are committed to a dual mission. The problem, in 
fact, is much more fundamental: the problem is one of verifying information about the 
intent of each party. Ultimately, and unfortunately, there is no way to prove precisely how 
committed investors or entrepreneurs are to the notion of a double bottom line. Because 
the information is nonverifiable, like Solomon presented with the two claimed parents, the 
best entrepreneurs and investors can do is rely on inferences based on the behavior of the 
other. See supra note 120. 
130 Baird, et al., supra note 8, at 122. 
131 See supra notes 32–61 and accompanying text (discussing for-profit and nonprofit 
forms). In a sense, the challenge of attracting capital mirrors social enterprise’s operational 
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respect they are unique. Unlike charities and for-profit entities, social 
enterprises cannot rely on external actors to enforce their respective 
social missions. State attorneys general and the IRS can punish a way-
ward charity for pursuing the self-interest of its managers.132 Market 
forces—perhaps in the guise of hedge funds or creditors—stand ready 
to seize control of profit-oriented ventures that lose their way. Unfortu-
nately, social enterprise fits neatly into neither category. Hybrid entities 
do not change that result.133 
 On a spectrum between the permanent legacy protection granted 
to charities by the state and the perceived jeopardy social mission faces 
when exposed to the market, hybrid entities fall dishearteningly close 
to the latter.134 On the one hand, L3Cs allow entrepreneurs to show-
case their aspirations but provide no mechanism to hold them to their 
ideals.135 On the other hand, benefit corporations and FPCs leave en-
trepreneurs vulnerable to investors’ temptation to abandon that hybrid 
status.136 Each party’s commitment to the double bottom line remains 
unknowable.137 Because entrepreneurs at the helm of an L3C and in-
vestors in a benefit corporation or FPC lack a means to signal credibly 
their commitment to pursuing a dual bottom line, they are unlikely to 
return home with a stag. 
1. A Focus on Investment 
 FLY Paper upsets the existing dynamic by shifting the focus from 
new entities to a new financial instrument. It allows entrepreneurs and 
                                                                                                                      
objective: to fill a need that traditional market actors have ignored and that governments and 
charities have proven unable to meet. Take, for example, the Q-Drum, a simple means of 
transporting water that is currently being manufactured and sold by a South African social 
enterprise. Q Drum, http://www.qdrum.co.za/ (last visited July 27, 2013). FLY Paper could 
be a similarly unconventional tool that allows social enterprise to flourish by tapping into the 
billions of dollars of capital some see standing on the sidelines. See infra notes 138–161 and 
accompanying text. 
132 See Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development: Regulating 
the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. of Int’l L. & Pol. 1209, 1239 (2010) (stating that enforce-
ment for the “U.S. charities regime . . . relies primarily on the Internal Revenue Service 
and state attorneys general”). 
133 See Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, supra note 14, at 738–39. 
134 The L3C, for example, can become an ordinary LLC without any prior approval 
process or possibility of redress. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra notes 80, 88–92 and accompanying text. 
137 Signaling occurs when possessors of nonverifiable information can communicate 
that information through their choice of actions. Baird et al., supra note 8, at 123 (dis-
cussing the challenges posed by private nonverifiable information possessed by one party 
but that “neither the other nor any third party can acquire directly”). 
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investors to signal credibly their commitment to a double bottom line 
for a specific period of time. By ensuring that neither can unilaterally 
abandon the enterprise’s mission in the pursuit of self-interest without 
meaningful sacrifice, FLY Paper invites both to join the hunt.138 
 FLY Paper achieves its aim by separating the task of mission pres-
ervation from the choice of business entity. Whatever type of entity 
houses the social enterprise—a point emphasized here by assuming the 
enterprise issuing FLY Paper is an ordinary corporation—purchasing 
FLY Paper allows investors to signal their commitment to the enter-
prise’s social mission and simultaneously acquire the power to preserve 
it. If the social entrepreneur elevates social mission alongside personal 
financial rewards, investors do the same by accepting a modest, poten-
tially deferred yield. If the entrepreneur yields to temptation, investors 
can seize the entrepreneur’s prize.139 
 Social ventures will not take their place between the extremes of 
charity and capitalism without access to capital. FLY Paper fills that gap 
by providing investors with an instrument of equal parts carrot and 
stick. By accepting a portion of their return in the form of a blossoming 
social mission while acquiring the power to punish entrepreneurs that 
succumb to self-interest, FLY Paper investors transcend the traditional 
dichotomy of “doing well” or “doing good.”140 
 Simply put, FLY Paper is a debt instrument with two special fea-
tures. First, because it provides investors with an opportunity to earn 
social returns to supplement their financial return, FLY Paper lenders 
demand no more than a modest, potentially deferred financial yield. 
Second, if an entrepreneur sells her stock, those lenders have an op-
portunity to claim the entrepreneur’s gains.141 The sale activates an in-
                                                                                                                      
 
138 As described above, in game theory terms, investors and entrepreneurs are en-
gaged in a coordination game similar to a stag hunt. A joint effort would allow them to 
catch a stag. Working independently, each party will catch only a hare. In the social enter-
prise context, entrepreneurs and investors could pursue both social and financial returns 
while the risk of defection encourages both to focus only on financial returns. A FLY Paper 
purchase credibly signals that both are committed to the stag hunt. Like the stag hunt, the 
pressure on entrepreneurs and investors to choose financial returns versus the preferred 
double bottom line can be represented by a bimatrix. 
139 FLY Paper obviously represents only one way financial incentives can be used to en-
force commitments. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Ian Ayres, Commitment Bonds, 100 Geo. 
L.J. 605, 607 (2012) (suggesting that commitment could be made more attractive if “in-
stead of simply promising to forfeit money to a charity in the event of a failed commit-
ment, the committing party sells the right to receive any forfeited funds to a third party”). 
140 See Brewer, supra note 45, at 685 (lamenting that “social enterprises are orphans 
when it comes to ready sources of capital”). 
141 The same restrictions need not apply to issuances of stock by the social enterprise 
itself. Recruiting talent, for example, by issuing equity to managers would be entirely con-
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vestor’s option to convert debt to stock on favorable terms.142 Assuming 
that does not occur, a FLY Paper investor would receive a return of and 
on the original investment, leaving the entrepreneur to sell her shares 
if she chooses once the FLY Paper matures or to make a renewed 
commitment to the social enterprise by issuing additional FLY Paper. 
 While addressing social entrepreneurs’ need for capital, FLY Paper 
also meets two critical investor concerns. First, social investors need as-
surance that their willingness to sacrifice financial returns will not 
merely provide a windfall to entrepreneurs.143 Second, investors must 
understand the nature of the investment being offered to them. 
 FLY Paper’s contingent conversion feature addresses investors’ first 
concern—that their sacrifice will merely line entrepreneurs’ pockets. 
An entrepreneur’s sale of stock will allow FLY Paper holders to convert 
their debt to equity on favorable terms, nullifying their commitment to 
a double bottom line.144 As a result of the conversion, they would con-
trol a share of the enterprise’s equity that their initial investment would 
have purchased, leaving a correspondingly reduced share for the en-
trepreneur’s buyer and a correspondingly smaller purchase price. 
 As to the second concern, unlike the untested new breed of hybrid 
social enterprises, hybrid instruments like FLY Paper have flourished 
on financial markets for decades.145 Sophisticated investors will readily 
understand FLY Paper’s details. Even neophytes will appreciate the 
shared trust it creates. 
                                                                                                                      
sistent with the existence of FLY Paper. So long as those shares were subject to the same 
restrictions as existing shares, FLY Paper’s power would remain undiminished. 
142 This essentially enables lenders to acquire whatever stock their investment would 
have purchased had they purchased equity rather than debt up front. Although FLY Pa-
per’s conversion feature is designed to produce results so unpalatable to the entrepreneur 
that it will never be triggered, it is possible that investors might negotiate with an entre-
preneur to retire the FLY Paper before its term ends. That could produce results similar to 
those that “tag-along rights” produce in the for-profit context (i.e., allowing small share-
holders to participate in sales arranged by insiders, thereby receiving a portion of the con-
trol premium otherwise paid only to the insiders). See M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing 
Duff and Phelps, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1739, 1750–52 (2007) (describing the operation and 
significance of tag-along rights). The redemption price for the FLY Paper would simply 
include the FLY Paper holders’ share of the sales proceeds. 
143 Investors would be disappointed, to say the least, if they made below-market loans 
to an L3C with the understanding that social returns would supplement their financial 
returns, but then the social returns do not materialize because the entrepreneur has cho-
sen to forgo L3C status. 
144 In addition, FLY Paper’s terms will either prohibit the payment of dividends or 
treat the payment of dividends as a triggering event allowing holders to convert to stock. 
145 Common examples of hybrid financial instruments include convertible bonds and 
preferred stock. 
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 For small investors, FLY Paper will be a “credence good” whose 
“quality is difficult to assess even after purchase, like financial advice, 
auto repair, or education.”146 Fortunately, they need understand the 
mechanics of FLY Paper no more than participants in the Google offer-
ing understood the intricacies of the auction process.147 Just like the 
broad audience targeted by Google’s “brilliant”148 use of its offering as 
a consumer-oriented marketing effort showcasing its “innovative, egali-
tarian, playful” culture149 a social enterprise’s potential investors (and 
customers) need only know that issuing FLY Paper demonstrates a 
meaningful commitment to pursuing a double bottom line. 
 FLY Paper can be issued by any entity that can borrow, including 
familiar entities such as a Delaware corporation. Over its term—even if 
the enterprise were housed in an entity synonymous with profit maximi-
zation—a substantial FLY Paper investment would do more to protect an 
enterprise’s social mission than any of the hybrid entities considered 
above. In game theory parlance, it would eliminate the financial tempta-
tion for entrepreneur and investor defection.150 As described above, by 
allowing entrepreneurs and investors to signal their commitment while 
screening out the uncommitted, FLY Paper gives them both the confi-
dence they need to jointly pursue the stag.151 
2. Broadening the Investor Base 
 Precisely who will provide the capital that social enterprise needs— 
rejecting both the traditional for- and nonprofit enterprise models in 
order to embrace the potential of a double bottom line—remains the 
subject of speculation. For their part, the creators of the L3C had a very 
specific type of investor in mind: philanthropic foundations.152 Each 
                                                                                                                      
 
146 See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 1600 (distinguishing credence goods from goods 
whose quality can be readily determined before or after purchase). 
147 Compare id. at 1594–99 (discussing the intricacies of Google’s IPO and auctioning 
process), with id. at 1600–01 (discussing Google’s marketing successes that attract custom-
ers, even though, as a credence good, the value is difficult to predict). 
148 See id. at 1600 (“From a corporate-finance perspective, the [public offering] was at 
best mediocre. From a marketing perspective, it was simply brilliant.”). 
149 See id. at 1584. 
150 See supra notes 117, 137 and accompanying text. 
151 Although FLY Paper could conceivably be used in conjunction with a hybrid form, 
the advantages of a combination are not obvious. For example, if a benefit corporation’s 
shares were owned by the entrepreneur, the shareholder vote requirement for a conver-
sion would do nothing to protect FLY Paper holders. 
152 See Brewer, supra note 45, at 681 (describing L3Cs as “designed to facilitate the flow 
of both private and philanthropic capital to ventures” and as especially “intended to en-
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year, foundations must satisfy a range of regulatory requirements, in-
cluding the distribution of a specified percentage of their assets in fur-
therance of their charitable aims. The design of the L3C embraced the 
spirit—and even incorporated the language—of those requirements.153 
Specifically, L3Cs were created to serve as a ready-made outlet for 
foundations’ distributions by streamlining the cumbersome approval 
process for program-related investments.154 
 To date, this particular ambition appears to have gone unreal-
ized.155  Although deep-pocketed foundations with a commitment to 
increasing social welfare and a mandate to deploy their capital repre-
sent one obvious source of capital for social enterprise, they are not the 
only option. Indeed, social entrepreneurs have a much broader audi-
ence in mind than philanthropic institutions.156 In theory, anyone pre-
pared to accept modest financial returns when supplemented by a posi-
tive social impact—sometimes referred to as impact investors—could 
prove to be an important source of investment.157 
 According to a series of recent reports, the future of impact invest-
ing seems bright. A significant number of investors, and well-heeled in-
vestors in particular, appear to have embraced the concept.158 A recent 
                                                                                                                      
 
courage private foundations . . . to make certain expenditures that qualify as program-
related investments” for tax purposes). 
153 See id. at 681–82 n.10 (indicating that the language varies among L3C statutes, but 
follows closely the tax regulations imposed under I.R.C. § 4944(c)). 
154 Id. at 681. 
155 See id. at 682 (describing program-related investments as “underutilized”). Program-
related investments “are special types of investments available to private foundations under 
narrow circumstances.” Id. at 681 n.10 (citing I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2011)); Treas. Reg. 
§ 53.4944-3 (2011). 
156 The breadth of the potential pool of investors is suggested by the growth in crowd-
funding: the act of “rais[ing] money from the general public,” through websites such as 
Kiva. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. 1, 5 (noting that “[b]illions of dollars have been raised through Internet-based 
crowdfunding since its inception just a few years ago”). 
157 Unlike the familiar category of socially responsible investors that merely seek to 
minimize the negative effects of for-profit activity, “impact investing” is defined as “the 
placement of capital (into social enterprises and other structures) with the intent to create 
benefits beyond financial return.” A Framework for Action: Social Enterprise & Impact Investing, 
United Nations Global Compact 4 ( June 2012), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/ 
issues_doc/development/Framework_Social_Enterprise_Impact_Investing.pdf. 
158 See 2012 Social Impact Report, Calvert Foundation (2012), http://www.calvertfoun- 
dation.org/images/literature/cf-sir-2012-final.pdf (indicating that in 2012, the investment 
community was significant enough in size to ensure the Calvert Foundation had $184 million 
in its lending portfolio). Calvert Foundation has offered Community Investment Notes for 
over fifteen years—an investment that, like FLY Paper, is designed to provide a blend of fi-
nancial and social returns. Community Investment Notes, Calvert Foundation, http://www. 
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survey of impact investments by JP Morgan identified 2,200 transactions 
worth more than $4 billion.159 Although substantial, those figures may 
represent just the tip of the iceberg. A second survey estimated that im-
pact investing represents a potential $120 billion market.160 
 Beyond institutions and wealthy investors lie other potential sources 
of capital. For example, the recent emergence of social stock exchanges 
suggests growing interest from investors of modest means.161 For those 
mom-and-pop investors, the need for a robust, off-the-shelf remedy for 
the mistrust that keeps social investors and entrepreneurs apart will be 
particularly valuable.162 
3. A Hybrid Financial Instrument for the Ninety-Nine Percent 
 Although it may seem exotic, FLY Paper builds on a long tradition 
of financial products designed to serve the needs of issuers and inves-
tors.163 In some respects, such as the issuer’s option to defer payments 
                                                                                                                      
calvertfoundation.org/invest/how-to-invest/community-investment-note (last visited July 22, 
2013). 
159 Yasemin Saltuk et al., Insight into the Impact Investment Market, J.P. Morgan Soc. Fin. Res. 
3, 3 (2011), http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/socialfinance/document/Insight_ 
into_the_Impact_Investment_Market.pdf. The J.P. Morgan study is neither the only nor the 
first to explore the potential of impact investing. See generally Jessica Freireich & Katherine 
Fulton, Investing for Social & Environmental Impact: A Design for Catalyzing an Emerging Industry, 
Monitor Inst. (2009), http://www.cdfifund.gov/what_we_do/resources/Investing%20for%20 
social%20and%20environmental%20impact%20Monitor.pdf (providing an in-depth discus-
sion of impact investing). 
160 Money for Good: The US Market for Impact Investments and Charitable Gifts from Individ-
ual Donors and Investors, Hope Consulting 1, 61 (May 2010), http://www.hopeconsulting. 
us/pdf/Money%20for%20Good_Final.pdf. 
161 See supra note 156. 
162 Unlike the deep-pocketed actors considered above, such retail investors lack the re-
sources to police a balance between social mission and financial returns. Although large 
investors can negotiate ex ante safeguards and carefully monitor performance, small inves-
tors ordinarily will not. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Net-
works and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must be Conditioned on Mean-
ingful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 1735, 1766 (2012) (noting that “the solicitation of small 
investors is likely to attract more unsophisticated investors who are in need of the investor 
protection provisions generally found in the securities laws”). See generally Steven A. Dean 
& Dana Brakman Reiser, SE(c)(3): A Tax Regime to Catalyze Social Enterprise Crowdfunding 
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors) (proposing a specialized tax regime to cata-
lyze social enterprise crowdfunding by providing entrepreneurs and small investors a 
ready-made signal of their commitment to the double bottom line). 
163  The Monthly Income Preferred Securities (“MIPS”) described below occupy a 
prominent place in that history and typify the careful craftsmanship that goes into their 
creation. See infra note 168. By today’s standards, MIPS are as cutting edge as brick-sized 
cell phones from the 1980s. 
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to investors, it is no different than many that exist in the market-
place.164 In others, FLY Paper is unique.165 
 The low financial yield FLY Paper investors receive is arguably its 
most unusual feature, but it addresses a universal problem: risk. Financ-
ing a social enterprise—particularly one in its earliest stages—with large 
amounts of debt would be risky. Given their double bottom line, social 
enterprises will have a more modest capacity to service debt than a 
comparable for-profit enterprise. 
 Hybrid financial instruments have long allowed businesses to raise 
capital without fear of either sacrificing control to new equity investors 
or stifling growth with up-front interest obligations.166 High-yield, pay-
in-kind debt offers one popular, and relatively simple, example.167 Such 
an instrument offers investors a high yield to compensate for the risk 
that they might bear significant losses. At the same time, because it is 
pay-in-kind debt, that yield need not be paid currently in cash, but can 
instead be deferred.168 Temporarily deferring payment of the promised 
high yield offers the enterprise a period of time in which it can focus 
on satisfying other financial commitments. 
 As with a high-yield debt instrument, FLY Paper promises the re-
payment of an initial investment plus an additional yield. Both instru-
ments grant an enterprise the freedom to forgo current payments, just 
as the recipient of an equity investment might forgo the payment of 
                                                                                                                      
164 That a debt instrument can offer issuers the right to defer interest payments with-
out casting doubt on the instrument’s status as a loan was once the subject of some contro-
versy, but it received the blessing of tax authorities nearly two decades ago. See David P. 
Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the New Financial Environment, 49 Tax L. 
Rev. 499, 503 (1994) (noting that tax authorities had indicated the right to defer interest 
might cause debt to be recharacterized as equity, but regulations viewed it as entirely con-
sistent with debt classification). 
165 FLY Paper is a low-yield instrument. High-yield debt, although often criticized, has 
been broadly used for many years. See William A. Klein, High-Yield (“Junk”) Bonds as Invest-
ments and as Financial Tools, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 505, 505 (1997) (noting that these debt 
instruments “acquired a bad name during the late 1980s when they were used to finance 
transactions that left target corporations with an excessive risk of insolvency”). 
166 High-yield debt gained popularity by allowing enterprises to avoid sacrificing con-
trol through selling equity or subjecting themselves to “stifling” commercial bank loans. See 
id. at 506. 
167 See Hariton, supra note 164, at 507–08 (describing the operation of pay-in-kind 
bonds). 
168  A very popular form of this hybrid financial instrument went by the acronym 
“MIPS” which designated “Monthly Income Preferred Securities.” See id. at 517–18 (dis-
cussing how MIPS operate and noting that tax authorities have noted and responded to 
”the issuance of a significant volume” of such instruments). 
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dividends.169 Purchasing FLY Paper from a corporation would grant the 
investor an economic stake in the corporation’s future, entitling the 
investor to a repayment of the initial investment plus a modest return. 
That return could be calculated in any number of ways, including by 
reference to standard commercial terms or could employ more idio-
syncratic metrics.170 
 Although in some respects FLY Paper is a quintessential debt in-
strument, some of its characteristics fall comfortably between the ex-
tremes of debt and equity. FLY Paper holders would have a claim that is 
superior to that of common stock owners but inferior to that of its con-
ventional lenders.171 FLY Paper has neither the brief lifespan of short-
term debt nor the permanence of common stock, but it would instead 
mature over a relatively long period.172 Although the duration of each 
investment would vary according to the particular needs of the enter-
prise and the goals of its investors, a term of fifteen years would be con-
sistent with the long-term goals of a typical social enterprise. 
 FLY Paper’s ordinarily dormant conversion feature offers investors 
a possibility—but no promise—of a far higher return on their invest-
ment. Unless entrepreneurs sell their stock, FLY Paper would mature 
                                                                                                                      
169 Particularly in its early years, if the enterprise chooses, it can issue additional FLY 
Paper that mirrors the terms of the original FLY Paper, rather than making payments in 
cash. That would provide entrepreneurs with considerable flexibility to manage cash flow 
to meet the needs of the enterprise. MIPS provided borrowers with similar flexibility, as 
“borrower[s] may defer payments of interest for a period of up to five years,” and if they so 
choose, “interest accrues on unpaid interest.” See id. at 517. 
170 One relatively anodyne option is the Applicable Federal Rate (“AFR”). The gov-
ernment regularly publishes AFRs for instruments of varying maturities, with yields deter-
mined on a quarterly, semiannual, or annual basis. See Index of Applicable Federal Rates (AFR) 
Rulings, IRS, http://apps.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/federalRates.html (last visited July 23, 
2013) (indicating that the IRS publishes the AFR monthly, and providing links to revenue 
rulings containing the AFR in reverse-chronological order). The AFR establishes a baseline 
measure of the minimum yield expected in an arm’s-length financing transaction. That 
would suit FLY Paper’s goal of assuring a modest—yet plausible—financial return. A vari-
ety of tax provisions rely on the AFR to determine whether a transaction represents some-
thing other than what it purports to be. For example, a mother might lend her son 
$10,000 for five years at an interest rate of 1%. If the relevant AFR were 3%, the mother 
could be viewed as generously forgiving two-thirds of the interest that her son would owe 
in an arm’s-length transaction. See I.R.C. § 7872 (addressing tax treatment of below mar-
ket gift loans). That distinction would be relevant if such a gift would have tax conse-
quences. Id. 
171 Such subordination is not, on its own, enough to trigger recharacterization. In the 
MIPS era, tax authorities suggested that nonrecourse debt might be at risk of recharacteri-
zation since “[s]uch an instrument . . . offer[s] the investor no more than a stockholder’s 
claim in the event of the issuer’s bankruptcy.” See Hariton, supra note 164, at 513. 
172 See id. at 504–08 (discussing the impact of an instrument’s term on its debt classifi-
cation). 
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per its low-yield terms. If such a sale were to occur, FLY Paper investors 
would have an opportunity to convert their investment into equity on 
what could be quite favorable terms. In broad strokes, FLY Paper inves-
tors would have a second bite at the apple, a chance to acquire equity 
that would give them a stake comparable to that they would have held 
had they initially purchased equity rather than FLY Paper. 
 FLY Paper’s unconventional design offers social enterprises an op-
portunity to simultaneously grow and protect their social missions.173 
Its capacity to solicit capital while promoting social mission will be sur-
prising to many. In fact, taking a step back from FLY Paper’s details, 
hybrid financial instruments might seem a poor match for the trans-
formative aims of social entrepreneurs.174 Until now, such financial in-
struments have been the exclusive province of the one percent, the 
weapons of choice for corporate raiders.175 
 Despite their origins, hybrid financial instruments could prove to 
be just as well-suited to the needs of social enterprise as they once were 
to the “junk-bond, bust-up takeover.”176 The best-known hybrids, such 
as Monthly Income Preferred Securities (“MIPS”), were designed to 
qualify as debt for tax purposes—providing interest deductions for is-
suers—while managing to avoid the accounting burdens associated 
with borrowing.177 Others, like the contingent convertible debt instru-
ments discussed below, pushed the boundaries still further.178 Through 
                                                                                                                      
173 This is, of course, precisely what high-yield, pay-in-kind debt accomplishes: allowing 
risky ventures a window of time in which to find their footing before interest obligations 
must be satisfied. See id. at 507–08. Pay-in-kind debt can crowd out equity investors under 
ordinary capital market conditions. In the social enterprise context, however, where access 
to capital is the very problem to be solved, this effect should not be too worrisome for 
entrepreneurs weighing whether to issue FLY Paper. 
174 They are, in a sense, the mirror image of their high-yield counterparts, which are 
primarily known for their role in corporate raiding, a far cry from social enterprise’s lofty 
aspirations. 
175 High-yield debt, pejoratively known as “junk” bonds, came to be associated with the 
“abusive takeover tactics” of 1980s-era corporate raiders such as the “junk-bond, bust-up 
takeover.” Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1, 11 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those raiders and transactions were 
popularized, or perhaps demonized, in the Oliver Stone movie “Wall Street.” See Wall 
Street (20th Century Fox 1987). 
176 Lipton, supra note 175, at 11. 
177 See Hariton, supra note 164, at 518 (noting that MIPS received more favorable 
treatment from credit rating agencies than ordinary debt because of their long term, sub-
ordination and the borrower’s interest deferral option). 
178 See generally Edward D. Kleinbard et al., Contingent Interest Convertible Bonds and the 
Economic Accrual Regime, 95 Tax Notes 1949 (2002) (describing the emergence of and 
response to contingent convertible debt instruments). 
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FLY Paper, these hard-wrought feats of financial engineering can re-
dound to the benefit of social enterprises. 
III. The Eye of the Holder 
 FLY Paper could upend the tension between social entrepreneurs 
and investors so that raising capital would make social mission more— 
not less—secure. By allowing social entrepreneurs and investors to sig-
nal credibly their commitment, the hybrid financial instrument’s in-
trinsic elasticity allows it to serve the ninety-nine percent just as effec-
tively as it has long catered to the needs of for-profit enterprises.179 
 Part III highlights a distinct aspect of FLY Paper’s flexibility: its 
ability to act as equity or debt, depending on its context. Not only can 
its design be altered to suit a broad range of financial circumstances, 
FLY Paper is a tax law chameleon.180 For mature enterprises, it offers a 
means of shielding income from taxation. For fledgling ventures with 
more potential than profits, FLY Paper produces tax consequences that 
parallel the fortunes of the enterprise. Only if and when investors re-
ceive a cash return on their FLY Paper might they be taxed. 
A. Tax Consequences of Raising Capital 
 Obviously, FLY Paper will only be successful if it allows social en-
trepreneurs to join with investors to pursue shared goals. Here, as else-
where, the influence of tax in promoting capital acquisition by an en-
terprise is less apparent—but only modestly less important. For 
charities, tax plays an affirmative role in promoting fundraising.181 In 
the for-profit context, the tax law more often presents a minefield 
rather than an opportunity.182 
                                                                                                                      
179 See Hariton, supra note 164, at 501 (“In exchange for capital, corporations can offer 
investors any set of rights that can be described by words, subject to any conceivable set of 
qualifications, and in consideration of any conceivable set of offsetting obligations.”). 
180 The infinite potential variations among hybrid instruments ensure that characteri-
zation of those instruments as debt or equity (or something else entirely such as “option 
premium, prepayment of a forward contract, swap premium, cap or floor premium, mere 
collateralization, acquisition of income or royalty rights, and actual ownership of unrelated 
property”) no easy task. See id. at 499–501. 
181 See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2006) (providing a tax deduction for contributing to approved 
charitable organizations). 
182 In addition to the overarching risk that debt might be recharacterized as equity, 
narrower constraints may also strip away tax benefits that taxpayers seek to incorporate 
into their capital structure. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(e)(5)(A)(i) (disallowing interest deduc-
tions attributable to some high-yield debt). 
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 Fittingly, the tax treatment FLY Paper would produce for social 
enterprise falls somewhere between those two extremes. In part that is 
simply a function of the income tax’s focus on profits and financial re-
turns. Unprofitable enterprises owe no tax even if they operate on a 
large scale.183 For social ventures, only financial returns give rise to in-
come tax obligations.184 Social returns are no more taxable than the 
proverbial beachcomber’s happiness.185 Of course, even financial re-
turns would go untaxed in the hands of tax-indifferent FLY Paper 
holders such as tax-exempt entities.186 
 As described in detail below, the tax treatment that FLY Paper re-
ceives—like any other financial instrument—depends heavily on con-
text.187 Even a transaction with superficially unimpeachable loan cre-
dentials, including a fixed interest rate and term, could be 
                                                                                                                      
183 See id. § 61(a) (defining gross income as “all income from whatever source de-
rived”); id. § 63(a) (defining taxable income as gross income minus allowable deductions). 
Income tax is structured to tax only income; thus, after deducting expenses, only profits 
are taxed. If there are no profits then, generally, there is no tax. 
184 As long as the yield equals or exceeds the relevant (and relatively modest) AFR, see 
supra note 170, the fact that the investor could have secured a higher yield should be im-
material. See I.R.C. § 7872(e) (defining a “below-market loan” as one yielding less than the 
AFR). In theory, authorities could infer a second transaction in which the investor receives 
additional income and makes a gift of that income to the corporation (either a single gift 
coincident with the purchase equal to the present value of the forgone yield or an annual 
gift of the forgone yield). 
185 Under an income tax, an individual who could earn a great deal—but chooses not 
to—is not taxed on the income they choose not to earn. The hypothetical that has been 
much discussed in the tax literature is the beachcomber who has affirmatively rejected a 
high income. See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark, Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty 
Objections to Endowment Taxation, 18 Can. J. L. & Juris. 47, 47–48 (2005) (describing the 
hypothetical and the key questions it raises); Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the 
Optimal Tax Model, 63 Tax L. Rev. 229, 243–44 (2010) (discussing the beachcomber para-
digm). 
186 Tax-exempt investors such as pensions and universities would, in essence, project 
their tax preference to shield a portion of the social enterprise’s income. 
187 Despite the dramatic difference in the treatment of debt and equity forms of in-
vestment, tax law has never managed to produce a bright-line rule to distinguish between 
the two. Instead, it has long relied on a standard that readily identifies paradigmatic in-
stances of stock or debt, but it does a poor job in close cases. The facts-and-circumstances 
test tax authorities and courts employ considers an improbably long list of factors. See Wil-
liam T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and 
a Proposal, 26 Tax L. Rev. 369, 411–12 (1971) (identifying four distinct categories of factors 
courts consider in distinguishing between debt and equity, including 1) “[t]hose involving 
the formal rights and remedies of creditors as distinguished from stockholders;” 2) 
“[t]hose bearing on the genuineness of the intention to create a debtor-creditor relation-
ship;” 3) “[t]hose bearing on the reasonableness or economic reality of that intention;” 
and 4) “[t]hose which are merely rhetorical expressions of a result, having no proper evi-
dentiary weight in themselves”). 
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recharacterized as equity.188 That would be true when circumstances 
reveal that the investment possesses the economic characteristics of 
stock, even if the parties to the transaction hoped for debt treatment. A 
financial instrument that—like FLY Paper—displays a preponderance 
of formal debt characteristics is no different. 
 The remainder of this Part explores two contexts in which FLY Pa-
per could be deployed. First, it considers a FLY Paper issuance by a ma-
ture social enterprise.189 There, FLY Paper would be acknowledged as 
debt, producing a reliable and modest stream of deductions for issuers 
and income for investors. That arrangement—with investors effectively 
shouldering a portion of the enterprise’s tax burden—provides inves-
tors with a secondary means of supporting the enterprise’s social mis-
sion. 
 This Part then describes the treatment of FLY Paper issued by an 
early stage venture.190 There, given the significant risk borne by inves-
tors, equity treatment would apply, eliminating the issuer’s deductions. 
As explained below, classifying investors as shareholders for tax pur-
poses would also impose a less onerous tax burden on investors. Those 
results—a respite from tax for a mature enterprise and tax conse-
quences for investors in a start-up venture only if their investment bears 
fruit—would suit social enterprise. 
B. Mature Social Enterprise 
 Purchasing FLY Paper will produce one of two starkly different 
outcomes. When a mature social enterprise issues FLY Paper, both the 
enterprise and the investor are taxed as though parties to an ordinary 
loan. As a result, each will have either interest income or deductions 
that must be taken into account on a current basis.191 That will be true 
even if the issuer exercises its option not to pay interest currently.192 By 
                                                                                                                      
188 Because the formal characteristics of the instrument are not determinative, courts 
look beyond an instrument’s form (such as the labels used by the parties to the transac-
tion) to determine its true character. See generally Hariton, supra note 164 (exploring the 
differences between debt and equity, and when instruments with mixed characteristics will 
be considered one over the other). 
189 See infra notes 191–225 and accompanying text. 
190 See infra notes 226–240 and accompanying text. 
191 Borrowers generally deduct the interest they pay. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006). Lend-
ers are taxed on the interest they earn. See id. § 61(a)(4). 
192 See id. § 1272(a)(1) (providing that deferred interest, referred to as original issue 
discount, is currently included in a lender’s income). 
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contrast, when an enterprise issues FLY Paper in its formative stages, 
neither party is likely to bear up-front tax consequences.193 
1. Tax Classification 
 When a relatively mature social enterprise issues FLY Paper, the 
enterprise is treated as a borrower. Like any borrower, it receives capital 
that it will deploy in its business and that it has the wherewithal to repay 
according to its terms.194 Although it can defer current interest pay-
ments until maturity, deferred amounts will themselves incur additional 
interest obligations.195 
 The substantial certainty that investors will be repaid is instrumen-
tal to FLY Paper’s status as debt for tax purposes.196 That confidence is, 
in a sense, reflected in what tax law refers to as the enterprise’s debt-
equity ratio.197 If the proceeds of a loan represent the overwhelming 
bulk of a borrower’s capital, the debt-equity ratio will be implausibly 
high, suggesting investors’ long odds of repayment.198 Compared to 
one in its infancy, a corporate enterprise that has a proven—albeit 
modest—track record of profitability will have relatively valuable equity. 
                                                                                                                      
193 There is no broadly applicable analogue to the original issue discount regime of 
I.R.C. § 1272 for equity. 
194 See Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957) (“The classic debt is an un-
qualified obligation to pay a sum certain at a reasonably close fixed maturity date along 
with a fixed percentage in interest payable regardless of the debtor’s income or lack 
thereof.”). 
195 The optional deferral essentially allows the borrower to expand the amount of the 
original loan. All borrowed amounts (that borrowed originally and amounts borrowed 
subsequently) accrue interest at the same rate. 
196 Risk—or more precisely, the absence of risk—is one of the defining attributes of 
debt. “Equity permits an investor to participate in corporate profits in exchange for assum-
ing corporate risks. Debt, on the other hand, permits an investor to avoid risk, in so far as 
that is possible, in exchange for forgoing participation.” See Hariton, supra note 164, at 500 
(noting that risk is at the core of what separates debt from equity). Lenders sacrifice the 
tremendous potential upside available to equity owners for the greater security offered by 
debt. FLY Paper issued by a mature enterprise would provide investors with the stability 
associated with debt investments. 
197 The debt-equity ratio, a measure of the relative size of investors’ equity stake in a 
corporation to the corporation’s outstanding debt, is a rough measure of the safety of a 
debt investment in the corporation. See Plumb, supra note 187, at 507 (“One evidentiary 
factor which gained prominence long before the articulation of the risk test as such, but 
which survives today principally as an element of that test, is the inadequacy of the equity 
capital of the corporation.”). A corporation with an excessively high debt-equity ratio is 
considered a risky borrower because it has limited capacity to pay its lenders. 
198 By contrast, if a corporation has ample equity relative to the amount it seeks to bor-
row, a lender can be confident that the corporation could use that equity to repay bor-
rowed amounts (even if, hypothetically, it is unable to repay the loans out of profits). 
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As a result, the same FLY Paper issuance would produce a significantly 
lower debt-equity ratio if issued by a mature enterprise than one that is 
more speculative.199 
 As an economic matter, the contingent convertibility feature nudges 
FLY Paper closer to equity status. Nevertheless, for reasons more histori-
cal than logical, even an investor’s unrestricted conversion right is not 
sufficient to transform a debt instrument into equity.200 Here, the con-
version right remains dormant unless the entrepreneur acts against his 
or her own interests.201 
2. Tax Consequences 
 For the reasons enumerated above, when a mature social enterprise 
issues FLY Paper, both the enterprise and its investors will be treated as 
engaging in a lending transaction.202 Some of the consequences of debt 
classification will be obvious. As the borrower, the enterprise will be enti-
tled to interest deductions when it makes payments according to the 
default schedule.203 As lenders, investors will have income when they 
receive interest payments.204 
                                                                                                                      
199 Assume two enterprises, Mature (valued at $200,000) and Fledgling (valued at 
$10,000) issue $100,000 worth of FLY Paper. They would have debt to equity ratios of 1:2 
and 10:1, respectively. The former is modest, but Fledgling’s 10:1 debt to equity ratio 
would weigh strongly against debt classification. 
200 Tax law so thoroughly ignores the conversion feature of convertible debt that it 
does not even give rise to original issue discount. See David P. Hariton, The Taxation of Com-
plex Financial Instruments, 43 Tax L. Rev. 731, 780 (1988) (“[A] convertible debt obligation, 
if issued at par, has no original issue discount. Interest accrues on the obligation at its 
stated coupon rate, which is generally below market.”). A more rational take on converti-
ble debt might do just the opposite and ignore its debt features in order to recast it as eq-
uity. This counterintuitive, and decidedly pro-taxpayer, treatment which tax law provides 
for convertible debt has been subject to critique. See William A. Klein, The Convertible Bond: 
A Peculiar Package, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 547, 570 (1975) (“[W]hy cannot the government take 
the financial analysts and the corporate financial officers at their words, treat all converti-
ble bondholders like shareholders and, based on this analysis, deny the corporation a de-
duction for the ‘interest’ payments made to them?”). 
201 By contrast, when conversion is a forgone conclusion, authorities do sometimes 
treat convertible debt as equity. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-98, 1983-2 C.B. 40 (treating converti-
ble debt as equity where the instrument was “structured so that under most likely eventu-
alities they will be converted into . . . common stock”). 
202 See supra notes 194–201 and accompanying text. 
203 See I.R.C. § 163 (2006) (providing a deduction for interest payments). 
204 See id. § 61(a)(4) (providing that interest is generally included in gross income). 
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a. Phantom Deductions 
 The issuer’s option to defer the payment of cash interest by substi-
tuting IOUs raises the question of whether that deferral option has any 
effect on the timing of interest income or deductions.205 One might 
expect a borrower would only be entitled to a deduction when a cash 
payment is made and that no tax would be imposed on an investor who 
has received no cash with which to pay that tax.206 Alternatively, and 
more favorably, a relatively sophisticated accrual method borrower 
might be allowed to deduct interest as the obligation to pay that inter-
est matures, while cash method investors would be allowed to wait until 
they receive cash payments.207 
 Specifically in response to such arrangements which cause interest 
deductions to precede interest income,208 the income tax has long em-
ployed a special timing rule that causes income from deferred interest 
to be taken into account currently.209 Under the same regime, borrow-
                                                                                                                      
205 Even setting aside the potential impact of optional interest deferral on an instru-
ment’s classification, the ability of taxpayers to claim deductions before they have made 
the related payment would—in the absence of special rules to accelerate the lender’s in-
come to match the borrower’s deductions—be prone to abuse by taxpayers. The original 
issue discount rules provide that safeguard, mandating a single schedule for both issuers 
and purchasers of original issue discount debt instruments. See I.R.C. §§ 1272–75. 
206 Individuals and small businesses report income and expenses using what is called 
the cash method, with cash receipts and payment generally determining the timing of 
income and expense for tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1960) (“Generally, 
under the cash receipts and disbursements method in the computation of taxable income, 
all items which constitute gross income . . . are to be included for the taxable year in 
which actually or constructively received. Expenditures are to be deducted for the taxable 
year in which actually made.”). 
207 Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money,” 95 Yale L.J. 
506, 509 (1986) (noting that until 1969, borrowers could deduct interest obligations as 
they economically accrued, but lenders were not required to include original issue dis-
count in their income currently). 
208 See Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Inter-
est Deferral and Discount After 1982, 38 Tax L. Rev. 565, 568 (1983) (noting that even after 
current inclusion rules were created in 1969, taxpayers were still able to exploit the 
“straight-line” inclusion method, prompting Congress to provide for economic accrual of 
original issue discount); Lawrence Lokken, The Time Value of Money Rules, 42 Tax L. Rev. 1, 
20 (1986) (tracing the history of the Congressional response to the timing mismatch al-
lowed by prior rules). 
209 Because FLY Paper’s yield is not “unconditionally payable in cash or in property” it 
is excluded from the “qualified stated interest status.” See Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c)(1) (as 
amended in 1996). Because it is not qualified stated interest, it increases the instrument’s 
“stated redemption price at maturity.” See id. § 1.1273-1(b). Stated redemption price at 
maturity is a key determinant of original issue discount, which the regulations allocate 
across the term of the instrument as interest. See id. § 1.1272-1(a) (providing that a holder 
includes original issue discount in income “regardless of the holder’s regular method of 
accounting”). 
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ers deduct interest before they have paid it.210 As compared to a regime 
that decouples deductions from both the payment and the taxation of 
the associated income, this “matching” rule does not seem particularly 
attractive for taxpayers. It can nevertheless produce surprisingly appeal-
ing results. 
 Because lenders and borrowers differ in many ways, eliminating 
the timing differential described above does not entirely foreclose 
mismatching opportunities. For example, tax-exempt investors such as 
pensions and university endowments can purchase investments that 
generate large amounts of “phantom income”211 without suffering any 
adverse consequences.212  For borrowers, the potential advantages of 
such an arrangement—enjoying the tax benefits of interest payments 
while deferring the payments themselves—can be considerable. 
 Nowhere is the counterintuitive appeal of phantom income more 
evident than in the instruments known as contingent convertibles.213 
The confluence of two distinct rules that apply to debt instruments al-
low borrowers to generate interest deductions that are both early and 
large.214 The tax law’s matching rule for interest payments applies to 
debt instruments with even the most unpredictable payment sched-
ules.215 For those contingent debt instruments, the regulatory frame-
work calls for lenders and borrowers to use a comparable noncontin-
gent bond as a reference for calculating their interest deductions and 
income.216 Tax law only ignores the conversion feature of convertible 
debt instruments when making a threshold determination as to whether 
the contingent debt rules apply. When the contingent debt rules apply, 
                                                                                                                      
210 See I.R.C. § 163(e) (2006) (allowing borrowers to deduct original issue discount). 
211 “Phantom income” refers to income tax liability arising before the related cash in-
flow. 
212 Wherever asymmetries exist between holders and issuers, possibilities for mismatch-
ing remain. See Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax 
Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 79, 92 (2002) (noting that, to the extent foreign investors are not 
taxed on original issue discount, the timing rules would not eliminate the possibility for 
mismatching). 
213 See generally Kleinbard et al., supra note 178 (describing contingent convertible debt 
instruments and their tax treatment). 
214 See id. at 1955 (explaining why tax authorities chose to apply the higher yield asso-
ciated with a comparable nonconvertible bond and exploring the differences between 
treatment of nonconvertible and contingent convertible bonds). 
215 Treasury regulations describe the complex framework used to apply the original is-
sue discount framework to contingent payment debt instruments (“CPDI”). See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1275-4 (as amended in 2004). Although convertible bonds are, as an economic matter, 
CPDIs, the regulations specifically exclude ordinary convertible bonds from the contin-
gent payment debt instrument regime. Kleinbard et al., supra note 178, at 1953. 
216 This is referred to as the noncontingent bond method. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(b). 
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the conversion feature of contingent convertible debt instruments is 
treated like any other contingency.217 As a result, a contingent debt in-
strument that can reasonably be expected to yield 2% annually in inter-
est could actually produce interest deductions of 5% per year when the 
value of the conversion feature is taken into account.218 
 Although complex, the tax rules that apply to contingent con-
vertible debt instruments produce a clear result. The addition of virtu-
ally any contingency allows the issuers of a convertible debt instrument 
to extract current tax benefits from a conversion feature that would 
otherwise have been ignored.219 When the holders of those contingent 
convertible debt instruments pay no tax on that heightened phantom 
yield, the arrangement is not zero sum. The borrower deducts, but the 
lender is not taxed. 
b. Shouldering Social Enterprise’s Tax Burden 
 For FLY Paper, those same rules produce a more modest, but no 
less appealing, result. Under the matching rule described above, both 
the social venture and investors would take interest into account on a 
current basis whether or not it is paid currently.220 Only the conversion 
feature—which will be ignored for purposes of determining whether a 
debt instrument is subject to the contingent debt rules—is contingent, 
causing the matching rule to apply but not the non-contingent bond 
method.221 Only the relatively modest yield FLY Paper expressly calls 
for will be deducted and taxed as interest. 
                                                                                                                      
217 “As discussed above, the conversion option is a contingency like any other if such 
option is part of a CPDI, and, accordingly, a nonconvertible fixed rate comparable yield 
must apply to a CPDI that features a conversion option as one of its several contingent 
payments.” Kleinbard et al., supra note 178, at 1955. 
218 Assuming purchasers enjoy some form of immunity from phantom income, the 
combination of those two rules can be quite advantageous. 
219 Kleinbard et al., supra note 178, at 1952–53 (explaining the convertible bond ex-
ception). 
220 See supra notes 215–219 and accompanying text. 
221 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(a)(4) (as amended 2004) (“A debt instrument does not 
provide for contingent payments merely because it provides for an option to convert the 
debt instrument into the stock of the issuer . . . .”). Even if one were to determine that 
the contingency attached to the conversion feature denies FLY Paper the benefit of the 
convertible debt exception, because the conversion feature is designed not to be triggered, 
it would likely be disregarded as a remote contingency. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(a)(5). 
Of course, by adding an additional conversion feature, an issuer could choose to skirt this 
exception in order to increase the debt instrument’s yield under the noncontingent bond 
method, just as the contingent convertibles did by adding the “‘bonus’ interest payments,” 
which caused the contingent payment debt rules to apply. See Kleinbard et al., supra note 
178, at 1953. 
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 Because the amount of phantom income FLY Paper generates is 
modest, even those investors that ordinarily shy away from it will be less 
wary. More important, any tax burden borne by investors comes paired 
with a tax benefit for the social enterprise.222 FLY Paper held by tax-
exempts will produce the same tax benefit without the tax cost, supply-
ing the favorable and asymmetric result described above. Adding an 
additional contingency could produce the same enhanced stream of 
deductions enjoyed by issuers of traditional contingent convertible debt 
instruments. More generally, whenever an investor’s marginal tax rate 
lies below the rate applicable to the enterprise, the social enterprise’s 
tax bill will not merely be shifted to investors but partly subsidized by 
the fisc. 
 FLY Paper would, in some respects, enjoy even more favorable 
treatment than ordinary hybrid instruments. When for-profit borrowers 
work to exploit the boundaries of the rules governing unconventional 
debt instruments, they encounter a variety of anti-abuse rules.223 High-
yield debt, for example, must run a gauntlet of rules that can treat a 
portion of those high yields as equity.224 When they apply, the recharac-
terized portions of the yield will not produce interest deductions for 
the borrower. Because FLY Paper has a low yield, such rules pose little 
threat.225 
C. Early Stage Social Enterprise 
 FLY Paper’s hybrid nature produces tax results that depend sub-
stantially on the context in which it is deployed. As described above, 
when an investor purchases FLY Paper from a mature social enterprise, 
the resulting relationship will be one between a lender and a borrower 
for tax purposes. Purchasing FLY Paper from a more speculative ven-
ture produces markedly different results.226 
                                                                                                                      
 
222 In essence, FLY Paper shifts the tax burden that would otherwise fall on the social 
enterprise to its investors, allowing investors to partially foot the enterprise’s tax bill. 
223 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(e)(5), 163(l)(3) (2006). 
224 The rules under I.R.C. § 163(e)(5), for example, prevent an issuer from deducting 
excessive interest under certain circumstances. 
225  Other anti-abuse provisions target “equity-linked debt.” See I.R.C. §§ 163(l)(1), 
163(l)(3) (disallowing interest on debt where holders have an option to convert debt to 
equity). Because any conversion would require affirmative steps on the part of both the 
issuer and the investor, even these provisions would not taint FLY Paper or strip issuers of 
the tax benefits that debt produces. 
226  Because the enterprise is speculative, even a relatively secure debt investment 
would be speculative. Presumably the FLY Paper will represent the lion’s share of the cor-
poration’s capital, giving it a high debt-equity ratio and supporting a conclusion that what 
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1. Tax Classification 
 Although many traits distinguish social enterprises from traditional 
businesses, risk is one they share. In their formative stages, neither type 
of venture can expect to secure much in the way of borrowed capital. 
Without either a significant track record of success or a meaningful 
pool of assets to serve as security, lenders would be right to be skeptical 
of the certainty of repayment. The repayment of any investment would 
inevitably be a product of the venture’s future success.227 Even if the 
investment is called a loan, it would represent a gamble on the enter-
prise’s future. 
 Tax law responds to such loans with an appropriate degree of 
skepticism. By employing a standard that embraces a wide variety of 
considerations, tax law evaluates investments at their inception to de-
termine whether to classify investments as debt or equity.228 Any pur-
ported borrowing by an early-stage social enterprise would almost inevi-
tably be regarded as too speculative to warrant debt classification.229 
Whatever labels the parties choose to apply, such an investment would 
be taxed as equity. 
2. Tax Consequences 
 From an income tax perspective, FLY Paper issued by a start-up 
social venture would be treated as preferred stock, and therefore as a 
form of equity rather than debt.230 Even if its terms were identical to 
FLY Paper classified as debt, investors and issuers would be subject to a 
                                                                                                                      
is in form debt is in substance equity. See supra notes 197–199 (distinguishing the roles of 
equity and debt and describing the effect of enterprises’ debt-equity ratio). 
227 Because they would only receive their promised yield if the venture proves success-
ful, FLY Paper investors would inevitably “participate in corporate profits.” See Hariton, 
supra note 164, at 500. 
228 See id. at 499–501 (discussing the common law approach of using defining charac-
teristics to categorize instruments). 
229 See id. at 503 (quoting I.R.C. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357, which outlined as one 
of the categories for classification “whether the issuer is thinly capitalized”). 
230 Tax law provides a variety of definitions of preferred stock, but the most relevant 
definition appears in the context of the rules governing distributions on preferred stock. 
They specify that preferred stock is “stock which, in relation to other classes of stock out-
standing, enjoys certain limited rights and privileges . . . but does not participate in cor-
porate growth to any significant extent.” See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(a) (as amended in 
1995). The conversion feature—although theoretically offering FLY Paper holders a route 
to participation in earnings—would not create a different result. Because conversion itself 
is such a remote possibility, “there is little or no likelihood of such stock actually participat-
ing.” See id. 
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significantly different set of rules.231 Current income and deductions 
give way to a regime that is more forgiving for holders and less gener-
ous toward issuers. 
 Perhaps the starkest difference between debt and equity classifica-
tion lies in the fact that interest gives rise to deductions but dividend 
payments do not.232 Even if—as is often the case with preferred stock— 
dividends are mandatory rather than discretionary, their payment or-
dinarily has no immediate tax consequences for the payor; the payment 
of that equity return will often trigger a variety of bookkeeping adjust-
ments, but nothing more.233 
 For recipients, a cash dividend generally results in the imposition 
of tax upon receipt.234 In other words, the matching rule that imposes 
current taxation on investors even when a borrower elects to defer the 
payment of interest typically does not apply to equity. For a FLY Paper 
investor who is treated as an equity holder for tax purposes, that gener-
ally means no phantom income. When dividends are ultimately re-
ceived and taxed, that dividend income will generally qualify for the 
low rates ordinarily granted to long-term capital gains.235 
 As with all instruments treated as preferred stock, there are circum-
stances under which FLY Paper will produce the same phantom income 
as a debt instrument.236 In the for-profit context, the careful design of a 
preferred stock investment can minimize the risk of phantom income.237 
Specifically, by imbuing preferred stock with features that grant its hold-
                                                                                                                      
231 Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4 (as amended in 2004) (tax treatment of convertible 
bonds, debt) with I.R.C. §§ 243, 301 (2006) (tax treatment of dividends and distributions, 
equity). 
232 To be precise, the payment of dividends does not give rise to deductions for the 
payor, but may give rise to “dividends received” deductions for corporate recipients. See 
I.R.C. § 243. 
233 See I.R.C. § 312 (describing adjustments to earnings and profits of payor corpora-
tion upon the payment of a dividend). 
234 See I.R.C. § 316 (defining a dividend as a distribution of cash or property); I.R.C. 
§ 301(c) (requiring that dividends generally be included in gross income). 
235 See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (providing that qualified dividends are entitled to the low 
rates applicable to capital gains). 
236 See Peter A. Furci & David H. Schnabel, Convertible Preferred Stock Investments by Pri-
vate Funds: A Practical Guide to Tax Structuring, 726 PLI/Tax 601, 609 (2006) (noting that in 
some circumstances “deemed dividends on the preferred stock . . . result in taxable in-
come to the investor without a corresponding receipt of cash (the dreaded phenomenon 
known as phantom income . . . .)” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
237 Id. at 615–33 (describing structures that defuse the threat of phantom income). 
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ers a largely theoretical stake in the enterprise that mimics common 
stock, the risk of such phantom income can be minimized.238 
 Fortunately, even in the absence of such safeguards, FLY Paper 
characterized as equity presents a lower risk of phantom income than a 
typical preferred stock investment in a traditional start-up. That is be-
cause dividends only trigger tax for investors when—and to the extent 
that—corporate payors are profitable.239 For purely profit-seeking en-
terprises, limiting phantom income by limiting profits is hardly an ap-
pealing solution.240 Given their dual focus on social as well as financial 
returns, profits are likely to be both relatively modest and slow to arrive 
for social enterprises. Fortunately, that means that phantom income 
will be too. 
IV. Private Autonomy and the Public Interest 
 FLY Paper accomplishes much that hybrid entities do not. Most 
important, it allows investors and entrepreneurs to reach a mutual un-
derstanding regarding their commitment to balancing social good and 
personal financial rewards.241  FLY Paper also provides a mechanism 
through which investors can support a mature social enterprise by 
shouldering a portion of its tax burden.242 
 Critically, FLY Paper does both without relying on public interven-
tion. Charitable organizations receive tax subsidies while operating un-
der the watchful eyes of state attorneys general.243 The important role 
charities play in meeting public needs not met by government actors 
easily justifies extensive public involvement. 
Although the case can be made that social enterprises serve the 
same ends, they do so entirely at the discretion of private parties. Entre-
preneurs and investors can—unilaterally in the case of hybrid entities or 
cooperatively when using FLY Paper—set those public ends aside to pur-
                                                                                                                      
238 Id. at 615 (“[T]he phantom dividend issues that normally arise in the case of pre-
ferred stock investments can generally be avoided if . . . the stock is designed so that it is 
treated as common stock . . . .”). 
239 Id. at 614 (“[P]hantom dividend income with respect to preferred stock invest-
ments generally only arises where the issuing corporation has current or accumulated 
[earnings and profit (“E&P”)].”). 
240 Id. (“Although most start-up companies have significant losses and do not have 
E&P, many investors are understandably reluctant to rely on that fact in structuring pre-
ferred stock investments.”). 
241 See supra notes 110–178 and accompanying text. 
242 See supra notes 179–240 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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sue purely private aims.244 Nothing prevents FLY Paper holders from 
negotiating with entrepreneurs to exchange hybrid interests for stock. 
They might do precisely that if they jointly determine that the 
potential benefits of transforming a social enterprise into a pure for-
profit endeavor outweigh the risks. That choice could either represent 
a triumph of self-interest over self-restraint or a calculated decision to 
shift attention to a new, more worthy project, reinvesting any gains in a 
new double-bottom-line venture. Either result presents private actors 
reaping the fruits of their collective efforts and choosing whether to 
rededicate those gains to social enterprise. 
The primacy of private autonomy in social enterprise gives crit-
ics and policymakers pause when they consider devoting public re-
sources to promoting social enterprise. This reluctance partly explains 
why statutes enabling hybrid entities contain no expensive public com-
mitments to enforcement. The freedom of private actors to decide the 
fate of a successful social enterprise makes justifying the dedication of 
public resources directly to them—by providing tax subsidies, for exam-
ple—very difficult. Our turbulent financial times do not help either. 
The trouble with hybrid forms, however, runs deeper than legis-
latures’ unwillingness or inability to fund enforcement or offer enticing 
tax subsidies. Today’s L3C, benefit corporation, and FPC fail because 
they offer no public or private assurances to convince social entrepre-
neurs and investors to trust each other’s commitments. New or revised 
hybrid forms could be more effective if carefully crafted to ensure the 
entities’ prioritization of public good and to enable enforcement. For-
tunately, we do not have to rely on state legislatures to reach the pinna-
cle of some race-to-the-top. 
As FLY Paper demonstrates, social enterprise can succeed with-
out public intervention and it can succeed right now. Its fate need not 
turn on the willingness or the ability of policymakers to enforce a bal-
ance between “doing well” and “doing good.” The proliferation of hy-
brid entities suggests that socially motivated investors and social entre-
preneurs do not control their own fortunes. 245  Nothing could be 
further from the truth. 
                                                                                                                      
244 The entrepreneur in charge of an L3C must merely begin pursuing profits. Share-
holders of benefit and FPCs face only procedural obstacles to abandoning an enterprise’s 
mission. If FLY Paper holders and entrepreneurs can agree on the terms of an exchange of 
FLY Paper for stock, they are free to do so. 
245 See supra notes 63–92 and accompanying text. 
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Conclusion 
 Social enterprise challenges the prevailing legal order on many 
fronts. FLY Paper demonstrates that responding to those challenges 
sometimes requires help from unusual allies. In this case, the hybrid fi-
nancial instruments most closely associated with bare-knuckled capital-
ism allow investors and entrepreneurs to telegraph their commitment to 
“doing well” while also “doing good.” Investors accept a relatively mod-
est financial return and, in exchange, entrepreneurs embrace limits on 
their ability to profit from their own efforts. That truce offers no guar-
antee that an enterprise will enjoy two equally robust bottom lines, but it 
does ensure that neither investors nor entrepreneurs can unilaterally 
upset the balance between them. None of the existing hybrid entities 
can promise that. 
 FLY Paper suggests a new way forward for social enterprise. Rather 
than relying on state governments to create untested business entities 
to constrain self-interest, FLY Paper allows entrepreneurs and investors 
to proudly display their commitment to a double bottom line. On its 
own, that shift from increasingly complex restraints to a focus on im-
proved understanding between investors and entrepreneurs would be 
significant. Coupled with the insight that private action can advance 
social enterprise without government involvement through the power 
of hybrid financial instruments, that transformation reveals FLY Paper 
to be an ideal fit for social entrepreneurs and investors. 
